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In reducing the fiscal deficit as part of structural  the taxation of domestic transactions.  His
adjustment programs, it is important to be able  overall conclusions arc:
to project what additional revenues can be
mobilized within ihe existing tax system as GDP  *  Discrctionary tax mcasures havc becn
grows.  effective in mobilizing resources from the
privatc sector in both countries.
To know if it is necessary to generate more
revenues - particularly through politically  *  Individual and overall tax revenues have
difficult discretionary tax measures - it is  becn inelastic in connection with GDP - except
important to be able to estimate the built-in tax  for corporate income tax in Malawi and import
elasticity as percentage increascs in tax revenue  tax in Mauritius, whosc long-term elasticities ex-
that result from endogenous incrcases in the base  cecd one.  Thcsc two taxes are inclastic in
when GDP rises I pcrcent.  tcrms of their own tax bascs.  Imports in Mauri-
tius and value added in the nonagriculture sector
Existing methods for estimating this elastic-  in Malawi havc grown faster than GDP.
ity are inadequate, so Ehdaic develops an econ-
omctric method for estimating built-in tax  *  The domestic consumption tax had more
elasticity and the impact on revenues of discre-  built-in elasticity than import tax in Malawi; in
tionary tax measures.  Mauritius, the domestic consumption tax fell
short of the import tax.  Because of thesc
His dynamic simultaneous-equation macro-  structural differences, economic growth has fed
econometric model of taxation captures the  the shift from taxing imports to taxing domestic
interaction between GDP, individual tax sys-  transactions in Malawi: it has reversed the shift
tems, and individual Lax  revenues and bases.  It  in Mauritius.  Without cconomic growth, both
requires only timc series data on tax revenues,  countries would shift from taxing imports to
tax bascs, and GDP.  taxing domestic transactions.
Ehdaic's model can also bc used to (1)  *  In both countries, discretionary tax mcas-
evaluatc thc macrocconomic impact of a tax  ures have contributed more to the trcnd toward
rcfomi program and (2) examine various tax-re-  domestic consumption tax than to the trend
lated economic issues.  toward import taxes.
In this paper, Ehdaic applies this model to  *  In Malawi, economic growth and discre-
the time series data for Malawi and Mauritius to  tionary tax measures have played almost equal
highlight the roles that economic growth and  roles in the shift from taxing intemational trade
discretionary tax measures play in cffecting the  to taxing domestic transactions.  In Mauritius,
shift from the taxation of international trade to  economic growth has been the principal factor in
revcrsing this shift.
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INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is twofold: first, to develop an
econometric method of estimating  built-in tax elasticity and, hence,
isolating the revenue impact of discretionary tax measures from that of
economic growth; and second, to apply this model to selected Sub-Saharan
Africa countries in order to  highlight the contribution of discretionary
actions taken by fiscal authorities to trends of tax effort and individual
tax shares during the  past two decades.1
The structural adjustment programs of  sloping countries use
fiscal deficit reduction as one of the policy tools for achieving real
economic growth with price stability and balance of payments viability. In
dealing with this deficit within such a framework, projections need to be
made of the additional revenues  which can be mobilized within the existing
tax system as GDP grows. These projections indicate the need to activate
additional means of revenue generation, particularly politically difficult
discretionary tax measures. Thus, it becomes essential to be able to
estimate built-in tax elasticity (hereafter, tax elasticity)  which measures
1/ There are a variety of taxes, such as import tax, export tax, excise
tax, sales/value added/turnover tax, corpora-e income tax and so on;
throughout this study, the term "individual tax"  will be used to refer
to each of these taxes. Each tax  has its own tax system--a set of laws
and regulations governing the process of estimation, assessment and
collection of its corresponding tax revenue--which will be called the
"individual tax system". The term "discretionary  tax measures (DTMs)"
will be used to describe changes in these systems which include changes
in statutory tax rates, tax bases, tax allowances and credits, and of
tax administrative efficiency.-2-
percentage  increases  in tax  revenue  resulting  from  the  endogenous  changes
in the  base caused  by a one  percent  rise  in GDP.  However,  its  estimation  by
means  of any  of the  existing  methods  suffers  from  a specification  bias due
to the  lack  of an  observable  quantitative  variable  capable  of reflecting
all  changes  in an individual  (or  overall)  tax  system  in  public  finance.
There  have  been two  major  approaches  employed  by priori  studies  on
this  subject  to deal  with this  gap.  One  approach  has  been,  first,  to
eliminate  discretionary  tax  changes  from  the  historical  time  series  tax
data (HTSTD),  and  then  to  estimate  tax  elasticity  using  the  adjusted  HTSTD
by means  of the  following  single-equation  econometric  model.
ln(T'  )t  - "o +  plln(Y)t  +  Et  (1)
where
T'-  adjusted  HTSTD  to  discretionary  tax  changes,
Y - tax  base (or  GDP in  aggregate  level),
E  = disturbance  term,  and
p1l  tax  elasticity,  defined  as  percentage  increases  in tax  revenue  net
of discretionary  tax  changes  due  to  one  percent  rise  in the  base
(or  GDP in  aggregate  level).
However,  a complete  adjustment  of HTSTD  to  discretionary  tax
changes  is  impossIh'e  by means  of any  of the  existing  two  major  adjustment
methods  -- proportional  adjustment  (PA)  and  constant  rate  structure  (CRS)
techniques.
In accordance  with  the  proportional  adjustment  technique,  the
historical  time  series  tax  data  are  first  adjusted  to a  preceding-year-3-
base.2  This is done by subtracting the budget estimate of the revenue
impact o1 DTMs implemented in a given year from the actual tax revenue
collected in that year, that is,
Tt,t =  Tt - Dt
where
Tt  - the actual tax revenue collected in the tth year,
Dt  - the budget estimate of the revenue impact (negative  or positive)
of the DTMs implemented in the tth year, and
Tt,t- the actual revenue in the tth year adjusted to the structure of
that year.
Then, to convert the Tt,ts to the first-year  base, the adjusted tax revenue
for the tth year (Tt,t) is multiplied by the previous year's ratio of the
adjusted tax revenue according to tha first  year's structure (Tl,t-l)  over
the actual tax yield (Tt.l), that is,
(T)  )1  Tl,l
- [ (T') 1 t|
(T')t  =  T  tl3Tt,t
Tt -1
After making successive substitutions, the following formula is
derived for (T )t, which is in terms of Tts and Dts.
2/ This technique  was first developed by Prest (1962).  Later, Sahota (1961)
employed a PA technique that, on the face of it, seemed different from
Prest's method but yielded an identical result.- 4 -
t-  Ti  -D;
(T )t -(Tt-DtJ)  I  (2)
jl1  Ti
According to this method, changes in an individual tax system
directly result in an exogenous change in its tax revenue, in other words,
a shift in equation (1).  These changes are, however, assLmed not to affect
its own and other individual  tax bases endogenously, and thus, its
consequences are not applied to the tax revenue. This is a strong
assumption which is  not supported theoretically 3 and its  validity has not
been tested empirically by any of the studies using this  method.4
For example, an increase in the tariff on imports of consumption
goods raises the price of these products (Pm) compared with that of
competitive goods produced in the  home economy (Rd), in other words, Pm/Pd*
In an attempt to maximize their utilities, consumers will decrease and
increase their demand respectively for the imported  goods and domestic
products. As a result, the import tax yield will decline due to the
decrease in its base inducer.  by an increase in its rate through the price
mechanism. Domestic production of these products and/or their  price will
rise because of the increased  demand, causing an increase in the companies'
profit (corporate income tax base) and a rise in the potential base for
taxes on domestic transactions, such as value added, turnover or sales tax.
Consequently, the revenues stemming from the taxation of these sources  will
3/ This assumption is strongly rejected,  at least  by the studies  which deal
with the use of tariffs as a policy instrument to protect domestic
industries, for example, see Balassa (1989).
4/ For examples, see Prest (1962),  Mansfield (1972),  Jeetun (1978), Sury
(1985), Gillani (1986),  Lambert and Suckling (1986)  and Sahota (1961).-5-
rise due to the increased tariff on imports of consumption goods (a change
in other individual tax yip-ds).
Similarly, the impcrt tax revenue endogenously responds to changes
in other individual tax systems. For instance, an ir.crease  in the income
tax rate will reduce disposable income;  private consumption will decline,
including the consumption of goods imported from abroad. As a consequence,
the import tax yield will fail because of the decrease in its base induced
by a rise in the income tax rate through the income channel.
Figure 1 represents the decomposition  of response of an individual
tax yield to DTMs within this framework. It is apparent from this Figure
that an individual tax revenue directly responds to changes in its own tax
system ("own-DTM direct response") and to endogenous changes in its base.
The base is endogenouslv influenced (i)  by changes in its own and other
individual tax systems throu 6h price mechanism, investment, savings and/or
income channels, and (ii)  by factors other than DTMs, particularly
variations in GDP. Therefore, the tax revenue indirectly responds to
changes in its own ("own-DTM  indirect response") and other i.dividual tax
systems ("cross-DTM indirect response") through their impacts on its  base.
More specifically, in the PA method, the own- and cross-DTM
indirect responses of tax revenues are not incorporated in the procpss of
the adjustment of HTSTD to discretionary tax changes. Furthermore, this
method ignores the impact of changes in the degree of evasion or of
administrative efficiency on tax revenues.
Finally, the PA method uses the  budget estimates of discretionary
tax changes (Dts). Such data are difficult to obtain in many countries and,- 6 -
FIGURE  1:  Decomposition  of Response  of an Individual  Tax  Yield
to  Discretionary  Tax  Measures
'Own-DTMs  Direct  Response"
.0  >  @or
flvr"Direct  Resporse  to  DTMs"
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Endogenous  Changes  in its
Base
Changes  in  Changes  in  Other
Its  Own  Tax  Individual  Tax
System  Systems
Factors  Other  than  DTMs,
particularly  CDP
"Indirect  Response  to  DTMs"-sum  of own-  and  cross-DTMs  indirect  responses.7.
if available, they are of qt1zstionable  reliability  as they differ
substantially from actual discretionary  outturns.
The CRS method requires data on income bracket (or  commodity) rates
and sufficAently disaggregated information  on the growth and distribution
of the reported tax bases.5 If such disaggregated information is
available, it  would be possible to construct a constant rate-base series
that would represent hypothetical yields under a system assumed to remain
unchanged during the  period under review as follows: 6
n
(T )t  _  z  (Ti)O(Xi)t  (3)
i=O
where
(ri)o - the base-year statutory tax rate on the ith income bracket
(or commodity),
(Xi)t - the reported tax base in the ith income  bracket (or
commodity) in the tth year, and
n - number of income  brackets (or commodities).
It is revealed from equation (3) that the CRS method incorporates
only the discretionary tax changes resulting from changes in statutory tax
rates; thus, it ignores those discretionary tax changes which emerge from
changes in administrative efficiency and in tax base, tax credit and tax
allowances. Also, in this method, as in the PA technique, the own- and
cross-DTM indirect responses of tax revenues are not taken into account in
the process of the adjustment.
5/ See Bahl (1972),  Andersen (1973),  Chelliah and Sheetal (1974)  and
Choudhry (1975).
6/ Chelliah and Sheetal (1974),  PP. 12-13.-8-
Furthermore, the needed information,  particularly on the
distribution of tax bases by rate categories, is not readily available;
hence, the effective tax rates --defined as assessed tax revenue over the
base-- of broad income  classes (or  commodity groupings) that are
empirically used assume that interaclass (or irteragrouping)  distribution
of the base will remain unchanged during the period under review.
Naturally, the validity of this assumption  will decline as the number of
the income classes or commodity groupings in the breakdown falls due to
aggregation.
Finally, Choudhry (1979)  argues that the constant rate structure
method becomes inefficient (P. 110), first, where a tax system  has many
progressive elements and, second,  where tax bases grow at the same rates.
Under the first circumstance, this method does not guarantee that the
estimate of tax elasticity  will be larger (or  smaller) than that of tax
buoyancy even when discretionary  changes produce overall negative (or
positive) revenue effects. 7 Under the second circumstance, there is the
possibility that the elasticity estimate fails to detect the effects of
discretionary changes.
Consequently, the adjusted HTSTD to discretionary tax changes by
means of any of the existing methods (PA  and CRS) involve measurement
7/ Tax buoyancy measures percentage changes in tax revenue, including
discretionary tax changes, due to a one percent increase in the base
(CDP, in aggregate level). It is simply estimated by means of the
following single-equation econometric  model:
log(T)  - ao +  allog(Y) +c
where
T =  total  tax  revenue,
Y  - tax  base, and
al- tax buoyancy.- 9  -
errors which, in turn, create a specification  bias in the estimate of tax
elasticity.
The other approach has been to estimate tax elasticity directly
from HTSTD using time trends or dummy variables as proxy for DTMs. Choudhry
(1979)  employs a divisia index (DI)  method in which time trends are
introduced as proxy for DTMs in the tax and base functions. 8 Briefly, this
method involves three steps. First, a formula is derived which generates an
index representing the revenue impact of DTMs. Second, the growth rate of
this index is divided by that of the tax  base; this ratio measures the
growth rate of tax revenue resulting from DTMs in terms of a one percent
increase in the base. Finally, tax elasticity is calculated by subtracting
this ratio from the tax buoyancy.
Apart from the questionability  of using time trends as
representative of DTMs, the major empirical implication  of this technique
is that the formula derived in the first step is a line integral and, in
practical application, its discrete version is  used, causing bias in the
estimate of the revenue impact of discretionary  measures. The bias is
downward (or  upward) when the discretionary changes produce positive (or
negative) revenue effects, resulting in an overestimate (or underestimate)
of tax elasticity. 9
Singer (1968),  Chand and Wolf (1973),  Khan (1973)  and Artus (1974)
use one dummy variable (simple  or mixed) as proxy for each of the DTMs
8/ This method is widely used in measuring the impact  of changes in
technology on the productivity of labor.
9/ For proof of this implication see Choudhry (1979),  pp. 87-121.- 10  -
taken during the period under review and they estimate tax elasticity by
means of the following single-equation  econometric model.
n
ln(T)t -=  +  Olln(Y)t +  Zfi2iDi  +  Ut  (4)
i-i
where
T - tax  revenue,
Y - tax base or GDP in aggregate level,
Di- dummy variable (simple  or mixed) as proxy for the ith DTM taken
during the period under review, and
01  tax elasticity; in aggregate level, it measures percentage
increases in the tax revenue resulting from the endogenous changes
in the  base caused by a one percent rise in GDP.
However, the estimate of tax elasticity obtained by this technique
is  not precise and reliable because of the serious multicolinearity problem
created as a result of entering more than one dummy variable into the tax
function.10 The degree of preciseness of and reliability on the elasticity
estimate are inversely related to the degree of multicolinearity which, in
turn, greatly depends on the time-intervel that existed between two
successive discretiornary  actions taken by fiscal authorities. For instance,
the partial correlation coefficient of two dummy variables is 99 percent
and 84 percent when the time-intervals  are one year and five years
respectively. This indicates that the degree of multicolinearity rises as
the time interval between two successive  DTMs falls, and it is still too
10/ For more details on the impact  of multicolinearity on the preciseness
of the parameters estimates see G.S. Maddala (1977),  pp. 183-190.- 11 -
high even when the time interval is five years. This simply means that
getting a precise and reliable estimate of tax elasticity by means of this
technique is empirically impossible, particularly  when thera are frequent
discretionary tax changes during the period under review.
Therefore, all the existing estimation methods of tax elasticity
suffer from a specification  bias which is  mainly due to the lack of an
observable quantitative variable capable of reflecting all changes in an
individual (o; overall) tax system in public finance. The primary objective
of this study is to develop an econometric  method of estimating tax
elasticity and the revenue impact of DTMs which deals with this lack and,
thus, with its consequences on the estimate of tax elasticity. Briefly,
this method is a dynamic simultaneous-equation  econometric model of
taxation which captures the interaction  of individual tax systems,
individual tax revenues and bases and GDP. As representative of each
individual tax system, its "average effective tax rate net of endogenous
(built-in)  changes in the tax yield and base" (AETRN) is introduced into
the model. Time series data on AETRNs are automatically generated in the
process of estimating the model parameters. The model explicitly
incorporates  both the direct and indirect responses of each individual tax
revenue to changes in its own and other individual tax systems, i.e., own-
DTM direct, own-DTM indirect and cross-DTM indirect responses. Its
application requires only historical time series data on tax revenues, tax
bases and CDP, all of which are already available for most countries.
In addition to its application as a method for estimating tax
elasticity and the revenue impact  of DTMs, this model can be used as an
empirical framework:- 12 -
(a) to forecast a government's revenue stemming from  various sources of
taxation;
(b) to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of a tax reform program which is
aimed at either generating additional revenue and/or dealing with
specific economic problems; and
(c) to deal with various tax related economic issues-- for example, to
investigate the welfare impact of moving from differential tariffs
towards uniform ones, which is often recommended  by the Bank, or
to examine the controversial  view that uniform tariffs results in
uniform rates of effective protection in industrial and non-
industrial activities.
In this study, this  model is used as an empirical tool to highlight
the contribution of discretionary tax measures to trends of tax shares and
tax effort in selected Sub-Saharan  Africa countries during the 1965-85
period.
A  shift from the taxation  of international  trade to the taxation  of
domestic transactions is recommended as one of the main objectives of an
administratively feasible tax reform program in SSA countries, where such
reform is often included in structural adjustment programs. The
presumption, however, is that discretionary tax measures play a crucial
role in effecting this shift. This description emerges from the experience
of a number of Sub-Saharan  Africa countries where tax effort has grown, the
share of tax on domestic transactions in total tax revenue has risen and
the import tax share has declined at least since the  mid-1960s, though all
three trends  have halted or reversed since the late 1970s.11
11/ Shalizi and Squire (1988),  P. 2.- 13 -
However, discretionary tax measures have not been the only source
of variation of tax shares; they  have also  been affected by endogenous
changes in tax bases causcd by factors other than these measures,
particularly econo:ic growth.
In SSA countries, fiscal authorities have taken a variety of
discretionary actions in order to generate revenue and to deal with
specific economic issues during the past two decades. In addition to their
revenue generating objective, corporate income tax has been used to improve
investment incentives and stimulate private sector investment in specific
economic activities/regions; import tax  has been applied as one of the
policy instruments to protect infant domestic industries against
competition of foreign ones; and domestic consumption tax has been utilized
to deal with equity issues and cascading problems in the production chain.
During the same period, nominal and real gross domestic product
have also grown, recording annual average rates of 13.4 percent and 2.6
percent respectively. 12
Among the major economic sectors,  non-agriculture (industry  and
service) has been the principal contributor to the overall economic growth;
the share of its value added in GDP has increased from 61 percent in 1965
to 67.8 percent in 1985. This has been associated  with the vertical and
horizontal expansion of companies in this sector, resulting in endogenous
changes in companies' net operating profit which is the potential corporate
income tax base.13
12/ The World Bank, World Development Report, (Oxford:  Oxford University
Press, 1987), PP. 16 & 173.
13/ Table 1 in Appendix A.- 14 -
Expansion of the non-agriculture sector has been mainly due to
sharp increases in domestic demand for consumption goods produced in this
sector. This inLcrease  in demand has been influenced  by a consumption goods
import-substitution policy implemented  by governments in order to
industrialize the economy. So the share of consumption goods produced and
consumed in the home economy (consumption  tax base) in GDP has risen from
66 percent in 1965 to 78 percent in 1985; in the same period, the share of
consumption goods imported from abroad in GDP has declined from 15 percent
to 10 percent and that of other imports  has grown slightly from 10 percent
to 11 percent resulting in an annual average decrease of 0.20 percentage
point in the share of total imports (import tax  base) in GDP.
These historical observations indicate the interaction of economic
growth with the trends of tax shares and efforts in SSA countries.
This study highlights the contribution that discretionary tax
measures have made to the shift from the taxation of international trade to
the taxation of domestic transactions in countries, such as Malawi, where
such a shift has taken place. It also questions the effectiveness of these
measures as a policy instrument for bringing about such a shift in other
countries, like Mauritius, where the country's reliance on the foreign
trade tax has risen during the past two decades. These are the tasks which
have been neglected by previous studies and are addressed by this research.
The theoretical development of the model is discussed in Chapter
II. To simplify its discussion, the model is disaggregat3d into three
blocks--individual tax yield functions, individual tax base equations and
identities.  After discussing each  block separately, the entire model as a
method for estimating tax elasticity and the revenue impact of DTMs is- 15 -
represented, and its dynamic multipliers are derived. These multipliers
measure the short run and long run impacts  of economic growth and changes
in each individual tax system on tax revenues and bases.
The application of the model to  Malawi and Mauritius is discussed
in Chapter III  which consists of two sections. In the first section, the
estimation method and results are discussed and the dynamic multipliers of
the model are derived.  Using these results, the contribution of
discretionary tax measures to trends of tax effort and shares is analyzed
in the second section. Briefly, the econometric application of the model to
these countries yields a number of interesting results. For instance, it
shows  that: (i)  discretionary tax  measures have been an effective policy
instrument in mobilizing resources from the private sector to the public
sector, to the extent that tax effort would fall in the absence of DTMs;
(ii) individual and overall tax revenues have been inelastic with respect
to GDP, except corporate income tax in  Malawi and import tax in Mauritius;
(iii)  economic growth and discretionary tax measures have had almost equal
roles in shifting from the taxation of international  trade to the taxation
of domestic transactions in  Malawi, contributing respectively 51 percent
and 49 percent to the overall growth rate of domestic consumption tax-
import tax; and (iv) in Mauritius, economic growth has been the principal
factor in reversing this shift, to the extent that the country would sh::ft
from the taxation of international  trade to the taxation of domestic
transactions in the absence of nominal economic growth.
Finally, a summary of findings and suggestions for further research
is presented in Chapter IV.CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
It is revealed from Figure 1 that changes in an individual tax
revenue directly result from changes in its own tax system and/or
"endogenous changes" in its  base. Its base is endogenously affected (i) by
changes in its own and other individual  tax systems through price
mechanism, investment,  savings or income channels, and (ii)  by factors
other than DTMs, particularly variations in GDP. In other words, individual
tax systems, individual tax  bases and yields and GDP are all interrelated.
Tt.eir  interaction is modelled in this chapter in order to estimate (a) the
direct and indirect responses of each individual  tax yield to changes in
its own and other individual tax systems, and (b)  elasticities of
indiriidual  tax yields, individual tax bases and overall tax revenue with
respect to GDP.
The concept of "tax elasticity" is defined to measure percentage
increases in *hte  tax revenue resulting from the endogenous changes in its
base caused by a one percent rise in  GDP. It is the product of elasticities
of the tax yield to its base and the base to GDP.
Regarding the second objective of this research, all individual
taxes are classified into five major categories.  These are: (1) corporate
income tax, (2)  other direct taxes (individual income tax, social security,
payroll tax, tax on property and other taxes on net income and profits),
(3) import tax ( tariff/customs  duties and other charges), (4) tax on
exports, and (5) tax on domestic consumption (general  sales, turnover or
value added taxes, selective excises on goods and services, taxes on use of- 17 -
goods or property and permission to perform activities, stamp tax and other
domestic indirect taxes).
To simplify this discussion, the model is disaggregated into three
blocks--individual tax revenue equations, individual tax base functions,
and identities.  First, each of these blocks is separately discussed; then,
the entire model as an empirical framework for estimating tax elasticity
and the revenue impact of DTMs is discussed.
Individual  Tax Revenue Equations Block
As explained above, an individual tax revenue is directly affected
by changes in its own tax system and its  base. To separate out the direct
revenue impacts of these two factors, each individual tax revenue assessed
by tax inspectors (Ti*) is considered to be a function of two proxy
variables, one for its potential tax  base (Xi)  and another as
representative of its own tax system (ri), that is,
log(Ti*)t- QiO+ aillog(Xi)t+ ai2(7i)t+ Lit  (1)
where
Ei  - disturbance terms as representative of other explanatory,
variables excluded from the model,
i - d, tax on domestic transactions,
- m, tax  on imports,
- x, tax on exports,
- c, corporate income tax, and- 18 -
o,  other direct taxes.
This function  was specified in semi-log-linear form essentially for a
reason of convenience, that is, it allows a direct estimate of tax
elasticity which is the primary objective of this research; furthermore,
this is also a preferred functional form used in the previous studies.1 Its
generalized version is, however, discussed in appendix B.
Given a discrepancy between the assessed and actual tax revenue,
tax inspectors  will adjust the actual  tax yields toward their assessed
level. This adjustment process is not, however, completed instantaneously.
Using a partial adjustment method, let us assume that they adjust actual
individual tax revenues, (Ti)t, toward their assessed level, (Ti*)t,  by
adding a fraction of the difference between the assessed tax yield, (Ti*)t,
and the actual tax revenue of previous period, (Ti)t.l,  to the actual tax
revenue collected in the previous period, (Ti)t.l.  This adjustment
mechanism is written in its log-linear form as follows:
Alog(Ti)t- Ai[log(Ti*)t-olg(Ti)t_l]  (2)
where
Ai denotes the coefficient of adjustment of the ith individual tax
yield, and  1> Ai >0.
The average time lag of the adjustment of the ith indi-idual tax revenue is
(l-Ai)/Ai,  measuring the average period of time needed vy tax inspectors to
complete inspection of the tax files related to the it!,  individual tax.
1/ For examples, see Mansfield (1972),  Khan (1973),  Artus (1974) and
Chelliah and Sheetal (1974).- 19  -
By substituting (2) in (1),  actual individual tax revenue function
is derived, that is,
log(Ti)t- AiaiO+ Ajcillog(Xi)t  + (l-Ai)log(Tj)t_.+  Aiai2(Ti)t+  Uit  (3)
where
Uit  =  XiEit,  stochastic term.
Estimating parameters of this equation,  Dwever, requires the
specification of proxy variables for the potential tax  bases--time series
data on these  bases are not available in most developing countries--and the
definition of ri, an observable quantitative  variable as representative of
the ith individual tax system.
Specifying proxy variables for potential tax bases is straight-
forward. For instance, regarding the data availability and tax structure in
SSA countries, Skinner (1988)  considers respectively  private consumption
(Xd), imports (Xm),  exports (Xx),  value added in the non-agriculture sector
(Xc) and gross domestic product (XO)  as proxy for the potential bases of
domestic consumption tax (Td), import tax (Tm),  export tax (Tx),  corporate
income tax (Tc)  and other direct taxes (TO).
However, it has been the lack of an observable quantitative
variable as representative of an individual (or  overall) tax system in
public finance which has complicated the issue of estimating individual and
overall tax elasticities discussed in the previous chapter. To deal with
this gap, this study defines ri as follows:
(ri)t= [Ri/Xi*]t  (4)20 -
where
(Ri)t - the ith individual tax yield at time 'It"  net of the changes
caused by endogenous changes in its  base during the first
year through the tth year of the period under review, and
(Xi*)t- the ith individual tax base at time "t" net of endogenous
changes during the first year through the tth year of the
period under review.
It is revealed from this definition that value of ri in a given year, say
'tt",  represents the average effective tax rate of  the ith individual tax in
that year in the absence of endogenous changes in its base and in its tax
yield during the first year through the tth year of the period under
review. Therefore, ri directly reflects all changes in the ith individual
tax system which are the only source of its variations.
However, ri is not an observable variable because time series data
on Xi* and Ri are not available. This study derives a formula for each of
these variables and, hence, for ri in terms of the observable variables ana
parameters included in the  model, whose substitution in equation (3)
generates an individual tax equation  with estimable parameters.
Let git denote percentage endogenous changes in the ith individual
tax base during the first year through the tth y.-ar  of the period under
review--on which time series data are endogenously generated  within the
model proposed to be developed in this chapter (see tax base functions
block). Using gits, the ith individual tax base (Xi) is decomposed into two
separable parts in terms of its two  major sources of variation mentioned
above, that is,- 21 -
(Xi)t-  (Xi*)t(l  + git)  (5)
(Xi*)t is that part of (Xi)t  which is exogenously affected by changes ii
its  potential tax base made by fiscal authorities and (l+git) is that  part
of (Xi)t  which is influenced  by the factors resulting in endogenous changes
ih  (Xi)  t.
By solving equation (5),  the following formnula  is obtained for  Xi*
(Xi*)t=  [(Xi)t/  (l+git)]  (6)
According to the definition of ri, its coefficient in equation
(3), Aia2i, measures the direct response of the ith individual tax to DTMs
(own-DTM direct response), and the coefficient of Xi, Aiali, measures its
response to the endogenous changes in its  base--percentage changes in  Ti
due to a one percent endogenous increase in  Xi (elasticity  of Ti with
respect to Xi). Using Aialis, each individual tax yield can be decomposed
into two separable parts in terms of its two major sources of variation-
-these are changes in its own tax system and endogenous changes in its tax
base--as follows:
(Ti)t= (Ri)t(l  + Aiacilgit)  (7)
where
Aiailgitthe  percentage changes in the ith individual tax yield during
the first year through the tth year of the period under review- 22 -
which result from git percent endogenous change in its base
taken place throughout the same period.
Ri is that  part of Ti which is directly affected  by changes in the ith
individual tax system, which is the only source of its variation; its value
at any point of time, say "t",  represents the amount of the tax yield
collected from the ith individual tax source at that time in the absence of
endogenous changes in its tax base during the first year through the tth
year of the period under review. Changes in  Ti resulting from endogenous
changes in its base are realized through (1+Aiailgit).
By solving equation (7), the following formula is derived for Ri.
(Ri)t= [(Ti)t/ (1  +  Ajiilgit)]  (8)
Now, by sub_tituting (6) and (8) in (4),  the following formula is
obtained for ri, which is in terms of the parameters and observable
variables included in the model proposed to  be developed in this study.
(Ti)t
(1  +  Aiailgi)t  [  (1  +  gi)t
(ri)t  -ri_  |  )t  (9)
(Xi)t  (1  +  Aiailgi)t
(1  +  gi)t
where
(ri)t= (Ti/ Xi)t=  average  effactive  indi-idual  tax  rate.
In  accordance  to  equation  (9),  in  fact, ri is the ratio of the ith
individual tax yield (Ti)  deflated by the index of that part of the tax- 23 -
revenue gained from endogenous changes in its  base, (l+Aiailgi),  over its
base (Xi)  deflated by ihe index of that part of the base which is not
directly affected  by changes in its potential base made by fiscal
authorities,  (l+gi).
Substituting (9) in (3)  produces the following equation with
estimable parameters for individual tax yields.
log(Ti)t=  AiaiO+  Aiaillog(Xi)t  +  (l-Ai)log(Ti)t_l
+  Aiai2(ri[(l+gi)/(l+Aicilgi)]}t+  Acit  (3)
where
Ai  =  coefficient of adjustment,
ail  =long-run elasticity of Ti with respect to Xi
Aiail=short-run  elasticity of Ti with respect to Xi,
Aiai2=percentage  changes in Ti due to one percentage point increase in
ri  'own-DTM  direct response) in the short-run
ai2  =percentage changes in Ti due to one percentage point increase
in ri (own-DTM  direct response) in the long-run.
Equation (3)' is non-linear in  both parameters and variables.  It
is exact identified. Its parameters can be estimated by means of a non-
linear econometric estimation  method. After estimating its parameters, time
series data on ris are generated by means of equation (9)  using a
simulation technique~.  These data can be used independently  to deal with
various tax related economic issues.- 24 -
Equation (3),  for i-d,  m, c, x, and o, stands for the individual
tax yield functions 'lock  of the model. Estimates of its parameters are
obtained by estimating parameters of equation (3)'.
If the specified proxy variables for potential tax bases are not
exogenously affected by discretionary  changes in potential tax bases (or
there  have not been any discretionary  changes in these tax bases during the
period under review),  historical time series data on Xis can be used to
generate time series data on gis. However, in the theoretical framework,
each individual tax  base (Xi) is linked to its own as well as other
individual tax systems (ris) through  various economic channels--that is,
the impact of changes in rc and ro on individual tax bases are realized
through investment, savings and/or income  channels, and that of changes in
rm, Td, and rx are recognized through the price mechanism.  This linok,  may
empirically result in a high degree of linear correlation between Xi and ri
in equation (3)  as a single-eguation  econometric  model, thereby reducing
the degree of preciseness and reliability  of the estimate of its parameters
and, hence, of the generated time series data on ris.
Fortunately, this econometric issue is not a multicolinearity
problem which is a feature of the sample; it is a simultaneity issue which
can be easily overcome  by expanding the single-equation  econometric model,
in other words, equation (3), to a simultaneous-equation  model in  which
individual tax base functions become an integral  part of it.
Having defined ris as observable proxy variables representing
individual tax systems, the development  of individual  tax base equations is
straight-forward.- 25 -
Individual Tax Base Eguations Block
Unlike in the case of individual  tax revenue equations, developing
a single-functional form as representative of all individual tax base
equations is impossible.  Because, as explained above, there is not a
single-economic channel through  which changes in individual tax systems
affect individual tax bases.  For this, the development of each individual
tax base equation is discussed separately, using as an example a country
whose economic structure and tax system is similar to those of Sub-Saharan
Africa countries.  In particular, this means a country in  which private
consumption, imports, exports, value added in non-agriculture sector and
GDP can respectively be used as proxy variables for potential tax bases of
domestic consumption tax, import tax, export tax, corporate income tax and
other direct taxes.
Domestic Consumption Tax Base Function
Using a Keynsian approach,  private consumption (Xd)--as a proxy
variable for the potential base of tax on domestic transactions--is
considered to be a function of disposable income (yd)  defined as gross
domestic product (GDP)  minus total direct taxes (Tc+To).  By entering Yd as
an explanatory variable in this function, the impact of the DTMs related to
direct taxes (changes in rc and ro) on Xd is explicitly taken into account.
That is, any change in rc and/or ro directly affects Tc and/or To through- 26 -
equation (3), resulting in changes in disposable income and, hence, private
consumption.
Consumers also react to the discretionary tax measures related to
indirect taxes (changes in rm and Td)  through the price mechanism channel.
For example, an increase in the tariff on imported consumption goods will
raise the price of these products (Pm) compared  with that of competitive
products (Pd) produced in the  home economy, in other words, Pm/Pd.  In an
attempt to maximize their utilities, consumers will increase their demand
for the competitive products produced in the home country and decrease
their demand tor those imported from abroad.  As a result, the potential
base for the cax on domestic transactions  will go up while the import tax
base will fall.
Another explanatory variable, (rm/Td), is entered into the
consumption function in order to take into  account the impact of .he DTMs
related to indirect taxes on Xd explicitly.  Obviously, the impact of that
part of the changes in Pm/Pd caused by the factors other than DTMs on Xd is
implicitly incorporated in the model by entering the nominal values of Xd
(private  consumption net of Td) and Yd in it.
The equation for this tax  base is assumed to have the following
functional form.
ln(Xd)t- fdO 6dlln(Yd)t+  Pd2(7m/rd)t+ Vdt  (10)
where
Xd = nominal private consumption  at factor cost,
Yd  =  GDP  - Tc-  T., nominal  disposable,
Odl >O, elasticity of Xd with respect to Yd'- 27  -
Pd2 >0, percentage changes in Xd due to one unit increase in (Tm/rd),
Vd-  disturbance terms as representative  of the explanatory
variables excluded from the model with standard classical
assumptions.
By substituting equation (9) in (10), the domestic consumption tax base
function with estimable parameters is derived, that is,
rrm[ (l+gm)/(l+amlgm  ), 
ln(Xd)t -dO+  Pdlln(Yd)t+ 8d2  ----  -- r------------  + vdt  (10)'
rd[(l+gd)/(l+adlgd)]  t
Import Tax Base Function
Similarly, using the traditional  approach to import function, the
nominal value of imports  net of import taxes--as  a proxy for the import tax
base--is considered to be a function  of nominal GDP at factor cost, (rm/rd)
and rc' that is,
ln(Xm)t- PmO+ Pmlln(ODP)t+  fm2(Tm/Td)t+ Pm3(Tc)t + Vmt  (11)
where
Xm =nominal value of imports  net of Tm,
GDP-nominal gross domestic products at factor cost,
Pml>,1 elasticity of Xm with respect to GDP,
fim2<0,  percentage changes in Xm due to a one percentage point increase
in (rm/rd),
,m3>0, percentage changes in Xm due to a one percentage point increase- 28 -
in rc,
Pm3>O, percentage changes in Xm due to a one percentage point increase
in rc' and
vmt-disturbance terms as representative of other sources of variation
in  Xm resulting from the factors  excluded from the model.
The import tax base function with estimable parameters is derived
by substituting (9) in (11), that is,
rm[  (l+gm)/(l+amlgm)  Ii  rc(l+gc)
ln(Xm)t=OmO+f6mlln(GDP)t+6m2  - -|  +fm3  +vmt (11)
rd[(l+gd)/(l+adlgd)]  t  (l+aclgc)
Corporate Income Tax Base Function
The impacts of changes in the corporate income tax system (rc)  and
the  variations in GDP on value added in the non-agriculture sector (X,)--as
representative of the potential base of corporate income tax--are realized
through investment channels. 2 Any change in the corporate income tax
system (say,  a decrease in rc) will affect (raise)  the after-tax marginal
rate of return to capital in this sector which will influence (enhance) the
level of investment in the non-agriculture sector resulting in a change (an
increase) in Xc.
Variations in GDP can also affect investment through the
acceleration principle which, in turn, influences  value added in the non-
agriculture sector; that is, an increase (or  a decrease) in GDP raises (or
2/ Value added in the non-agriculture sector (Xc)  is considered as a proxy
for the potential base of corporate income tax due to the lack of time
series data on the  wage bill in this sector in  most LDCs. However, in
the countries where such time series data are available, the wage bill
should be deducted from Xc.- 29 -
reduces) aggregate demand, including demand for goods and services produced
in the non-agriculture sector.  As a result, investment in this sector rises
(or falls), resulting in an increase (or a decrease) in Xc.
Consequently,  Xc is negatively related to rc and positively linked
to gross domestic product. Its equation is assumed  o have the following
functional form.3
ln(Xc)t- PcO+ Pclln(GDP)t+  fc2(rc)t + Pc3(Tm/Td)t+ vct  (12)
where
XC  -nominal value of value added in non-agriculture sector  net of
corporate income tax at factor cost,
vct'disturbance terms as representative of other sources of variation
of Xc resulting from the factors excluded from the model,
Pcl>
0 ,  elasticity of Xc with respect to GDP, and
6c2<O, percentage changes in  Xc due to one percentage point change in
I-c.
Furthermore, the  value added in the non-agriculture sector is
linked to the DTMs related to indirect individual taxes (changes  in rw and
rd) through price mechanism. For instance, a decrease in the tariff on the
import of raw materials utilized in the non-agriculture sector  will reduce
3/ Using Lewis' approach, labor as another factor of production has been
dropped from this equation  because there is an excess supply of labor in
SSA countries, as in most LDCs.  One may argue that there is a shortage
of a skilled labor force in the non-agriculture sector. However,
training unskilled labor, in turn, requires  more investment; therefore,
it is plausible to assume that the level of employment in this sector is
highly dependent on the rate of capital formation rather than on other
factors, and to drop it from equation 12.- 30 -
the production cost and, hence, will raise the value added in this sector
or an increase in the tariff on the import of industrial consumption goods
will raise demand for competitive commodities produced in the hoi,ie  country
resulting in a rise in production and, thus, an increase in Xn.
This study entered (rm/rd) into equation (12) as another explanatory
variable in order to capture the impact of the DTMs related to indirect
taxes on Xc directly.  However, the sign of the coefficient of this
variable (Pc3)  will depend on the sizes of the estimates of Oml and #dl,
and the shares of Xd and Xm into  GDP as well as on the structure of the
import tax system and imports.  For example, in the countries where Imports
of non-consumption goods are not subject to import tax, flc3  will be
positive if and only if Ocl(Xc/GDP)  >  Pml(Xm/GDP)
However, the ambiguity on the sign of Pc3 can be easily overcome by
disaggregating import taxes into two major categories of imports, in other
words, imports of consumption goods and other imports.
By substituting equation (9) in (12),  the corporate income tax base
function  with estimable parameters is obtained, that is,
ln(Xc)t- Pco+ 6clln(GDP)t+ Oc2(rd[(l+gd)/(l+cdlgd)])t
+  rm[  (l+gm)/(l'+mlgm)  ]  1  t
+ Pc3  + vct  (12)'
rd[(l+gd)/(l+adlgd)  it
Export Tax Base Function
The nominal value of exports net of export taxes as a proxy for an
export tax base is simply considered to be a function  of the weighted- 31 -
average  of  GDP  of importer  countries  (GDPw)--the  weight  for  each  importer
country  being  the  ratio  of exports  to this  country  over  total  exports--and
ris.  Its  equation  is  assumed  to  have the  following  functional  form.
ln(Xx)t.pxo+, 8xlln(GDPw)t+  E[Pxj(rj)t]+  vXt  (13)
where
Xx -nominal  export  net  of export  taxes  in  terms  of the  exporter
national  currency,
GDPW-weighted  average  of nominal  GDP  of the  importer  countries
in terms  of  national  currency  of the  exporter  country,
Px1>O,  elasticity  of  Xx with  respect  to  GDPW,  and
Pxj<O,  percentage  changes  in  Xx  with respect  to a one  percentage  point
chango  in  rj,  for  j-  "x",  mti,  "d",  "o" and "c".
After  substituting  equation  (9) in  (13),  the  following  export  tax
base function  with estimable  parameters  is  derived.
ln(Xx)t=  PxO+  Pxlln(GDPw)t  +  E(Pxj[rj(l+gj)/(l+ajlgj)]t)+  vxt  (13)'
where
(gj)t=ln(Xi)t-  ln(Xj)l, for j-"m", "d",  x,  and  c
As an another  explanatory  variable,  the  GDP  of the  exporter  country
was  excluded  from  this  equation  for  the  following  reason.  Export  tax is  a
consumption  or rent  type  tax  which  is  levied  on the  products  exported  to
foreign  countries.  It is  not a tax  on the  domestic  production  or domestic
consumption  of these  goods.  Therefore,  the  export  tax  base (Xx)  is- 32 -
considered to be a function of the factors  which affect the demand of
foreigners for the exportable products, in other words, the GDP of importer
countries, relative prices and ris. Indeed, the factors which inflt?nce
domestic production or consumption of these products may affect Xx through
the  price mechanism. Equation (13)'  implicitly incorporates the impact of
such changes on Xx because the nominal value of Xx and GDPW are entered
into that equation.
Since the primary objective of this study is to estimate individual
and overall tax elasticities  with respect to the GDP of the home country,
the export tax revenue and base functions are excluded from the entire
model as an empirical framework for estimating tax elasticity and the
revenue impact of discretionary tax measures.
Equations (10), (11) and (12)  perform the individual tax base
functions  block of the model. Estimates of their parameters are obtained by
estimating the parameters of equations (3)', (10)', (11)' and (12)'  by
means of a non-linear simultaneous-equation  econometric estimation method.
Identities Block
Disposable income is the difference between GDP and direct taxes,
that is,
(yd)t  (GDP)t- (Tc)t- (To)t  (14)- 33 -
All of the  variables included in (14)  appear in logarithmic form in the
equations developed above--equations (3), (10), (11) and (12).  For reasons
of convenience, it is also transferred to a log-linear form as follows:
ln(yd)t  In(GDP)t  ln(TC)t  In(TO)t
e  -e  -e  - e  (15)
Using Taylor's series, equation (15) is expanded around the
geometric mean value of the variables included in it, that is,
ln(Yd)t - 7o +  lln(GDP)t  +  721n(Tc)t + 731n(TO)t  (16)
where




and "*"  denotes geometric mean value.
The total tax revenue net of export taxes is simply the sum of the
other individual tax yields, that is,
(T)t= (Tc)t  + (To)t  + (Td)t  +(Tm)t  (17)
Using the method mentioned above and expanding equation (17)  around
the geometric mean value of the variables included in it and then making a
simple manipulation, this equation is converted to the following log-linear
form which allows a direct estimate to  be made of the automatic response of
the overall tax system to  variation in GDP:- 34 -
ln(T)t- 60+ 6eln(Tc)t+ Soln(TO)t+6dln(Td)t+6mln(Tm)t  (18)
where
60-  log(T)*- E[(Ti/T)*log(Ti)*,
6 i- (Ti/T)*  >0, and i-c, o, d, m.
Equations (16), (17) and (19) are deterministic functions  whose
parameters can be estimated either by using the mean value of time series
data on the variables included in them or by the OLS estimation method.
Entire Model And Its Dynamic Multipliers
Equations (3)--for isc, d, m, o--,  (10), (11), (12), (16) and (18)
provide the structural form of the model developed in this s,udy (Table 1).
Efficient and consistent estimates of its parameters are obtained by
estimating the parameters of equations (3)', (10)', (11)', (12)', (16)  and
(18)  by means of a simultaneous-equation  non-linear econometric estimation
technique (Table 2).4
Using the estimated parameters, the time series data on ris are
generated by means of equation (9).  These data can be used independently to
investigate the impact of changes in individual  tax systems on various key
macroeconomic variables, such as savings, inflation, investment, economic
growth, international balance of payments, and so on. To simplify the
derivation of the revenue impact of changes in each individual tax system
4/ There are four simultaneous-equation  non-linear estimation methods.
These are: three-stage non-linear least squares, iteration, search and
maximum likelihood estimation techniques.  For more details, see
Maddala(1977), pp. 144-146; also Fair(1984) pp. 120-138.- 35 -
Table 1: Structural Form of the Model
log(Td)t  A.dadO+ Adadll0g(Xd)t  +  (l-Ad)log(Td)t-l+  Adad2(Td)t+  Udt
log(Tm)t-  AlnamO+ Am*mllg(Xm)t  +  (l-Am)log(Tm)t-l+  A%im2(7m)t+  Umt
log(Tc)t-  caco+  Acacllog(Xc)t  +  (l-Xc)log(Tc)t-l-.  Acac2(rc)t+  Uct
log(To)t-=  AoaoO+  Xoaollog(Xo)t  +  (l-Ao)logkTO)t_.+  XoQo2(ro)t+  Uot
ln(Xd)t- OdO Pdlln(Yd)t+ Pd2(7m/fd)t+ vdt
ln(Xm)t- PmO+ 8mlln(GDP)t+ Pm2(rm/rd)t+ Pm3(rc)t + umc
ln(XC)t-  Pco+  6clln(GDP)t+  Pc2(Tc)t  +  Pc3(?m/Td)t+  Vct
ln(T)t  - 60+  Sdln(Td)t+  6mln(Tm)t+  Scln(Tc)t+  Soln(TO)-
ln(Yd)t  °O  +-tlln(GDP)t+  721n(TC)t+  131n(TO)t
(Tm/Td)t= 90 +  l(rm)t  + 02(fd)t
where
Td=  Tax  on domestic  transactions  (endogenous  variable),
Tm- Import tax (endogenous  variable),
Tc= Corporate income tax (endogenous  variable),
To=  Other  direct  taxes  (endogenous  variable),
Xd- Private  consumption  (endogenous  variable),
Xm= Imports  (endogenous  variables),
Xc= Value added in  non-agriculture sector (endogenous  variable),
XO= GDP- gross domestic products (exogenous  variable),
ri= The ith  individual realized tax rate (exogenous  variable),
for i- d, m, c, o,
Yd- Disposable income (endogenous  varI'able),
r-  Total  tax  revenue  net  of export  taxes  (endogenous  variable).- 36 -
Table 2: Entire Model with Estimable Parameters
l+9d1
ln(Td)t- AdcadO+  Adadlln(Xd)t  +  (l-Ad)ln(Td)t-l  +Adc1d2  rd -+g  1  - I-+dt
1+Adcldlgd  J  t
ln(Tm)t°  Amamo+ Amamlln(Xm)t  +  (l-Xm)ln(Tm)t-l  +Amsm2  jrm  ]+mt
l+Amamlgm  t
[  1+g  1
ln(Tc)t  Acaco+  Acaclln(Xc)t  +  (l-Ac)ln(Tc)t-l  +Ac%2  rc  g  J
1+A\CIc lgC-  t
r  l+g0 1
ln(TO)t-  Aoaoo+  Aoaolii-.Xo)t  +  (l-Ao)ln(To)t-l  +Aoao2  r0 - g  +
1  +A\oaolgo  .t
r  rm[ (l+gm)/(l+amlgm)]  1
ln(Xd)t  P-dO+  Pdlln(Yd)t+ Pd2  g  +  vdt
rd[(l+gd)/(l+adlgd)]  t
frm[  (l+gm)/(l+amlgm)]  1  rC(l+gc)
ln(Xm)tsPmo+PmllnC(GDP)t+Pm2  +Pm3  +vmt
rd[(l+gd)/(l+adlgd)]  t  (l+aclgc)
l+gd  1  rrm(l+gm)/(l+amlgm)
ln(X 0)t-  PcO+ Pclln(GDP)t+  1+c2  rd  +  Pc3  - +Uct
1+atdlgd  Jt  rd(l+gd)/(I+cgdlgd)  t
ln(T)t - 60+ 6dln(Td)t+ 6mln(Tm)t+ 6cln(Tc)t+ 601n(To)t
ln(Yd)t =  YO  +ylln(GDP)t+ y2ln(Tc)t+ y31n(TO)t
g(i)t- ln(Xi)t- ln(Xi)O  for i-d,  m, c, o
Est-mating the parameters of the model requires time series data on Tis, T,
Xis, ria, and GDP which are readily available for most LDCs in GFS(an IMF
publication) and World Tables (a  World Bank publication).-37  -
from the estimated parameters of the model, this study uses the generated
time series data on ris to linearize ('m/'d) in order to keep the entire
model in semi-log linear form.  Its linear form is obtained by expanding it
around the mean value of ris using Taylor's series,  which is,




2-  [rm/(Td)2]* <0.
Equation (19) is a deterministic equation whose parameters can be
estimated using either the mean value of the generated time series data on
ris or the OLS estimation technique.
Consequently, the structural form of the model with estimated
parameters will include ten equations--equations (3), for i-d, c, o, m, and
(10), (11), (12), (16), (18)  and (19)--  and ten endogenous, five exogenous,
and four predetermined endogenous  variables. It is a simultaneous equations
system which can be written in the following form using matrix notation.
A +  B(Y)t +  C(Y)t-l +  D(X)t  0.  (21)
where
A- lOxlO matrix of constant terms,
B- lOxlO matrix of coefficients of dependent variables,
C- lOxlO  matrix  of  coefficients  of  lagged  dependent  variables,- 38 -
D- lOx5 matrix of coefficients of exogenous  variables,
Yt- lOxI column vector of endogenous  variables, and
Xt- 5xl column vector of exogenous variables.
By treating predetermined lagged dependent variables as exogenous
ones, the  model is an ordinary equations system;  by solving it, the reduced
form of the model is obtained, that is,
Yt= -B-1A - B-lC(Y)t-l  B-lD(X)t  (22)
In this equation, each of the endogenous  variables is a function of all the
exogenous variables included in the model--these are ln(GDP)t, ln(Ti)t-l
and ris. The ijth element of [-B- 1 D] measures the instantaneous impact of a
unit change in the jth exogenous  variable on the ith endogenous variable
(impact  multipliers).
For instance, the ith individual  tax yield equation in its reduced
form  will be:
ln(Ti)t=4iO +  4illn(GDP)t +  ZOij2ln(Tj)t-l  +  ZOij3(rj)t  (20)
where
j  cm,  d, c, o,
Oil -short-run  elasticity of the  Ti with respect to GDP,
4ij3=percentage changes in Ti due to a one percentage point change in
rj; for i#j, it  measures the short-run impact of changes in the
jth individual tax system on the ith individual tax revenue
(cross-DTM indirect response),- 39 -
and, for i-J, it measures the short run overall impact of a one percentage
point increase in ri on its corresponding tax yield (sum  of the own-DTM
direct and indirect responses). Its short run own-DTM direct response is
measured by the coefficient of ri in equation (3), in other words, ai3;
therefore, its short run own-DTM indirect response is simply measured by
'ii3-ji3-
The elements of [-B- 1D] related to the coefficients of ln(GDP),
measuring the short-run tax elasticities, and rjs, measuring the short-run
revenue impacts of DTMs, are presented in Tables 3-7.
By treating lagged dependent variables as endogenous ones, the
structural form of the model is a system of difference eguations; by
solving it, the final form of the  model is obtained which is,
Yt  [I  + B 1lC]Pl  B- 1 A]  + [I  + B-lC]-G[-B-lD](X)t  (23)
where
I= lOxlO unit matrix.
In this equation, each of the endogenous  variables is a function of all the
exogenous variables included in the model--these are ln(GDP) and rjs. The
ijth element of ([I+B-lC]-l[-B-lD])  measures the total impact of a unit
change in the jth exogenous variable on the ith endogenous variable (total
multipliers). For instance, the ith individual tax yield equation in its
final form will be:
ln(Ti)t= 'iO  + Oilln(GDP)t  + ZOij2(rj)t  for j=m,d,c,o  (21)- 40 -
Table 3: Short Run and Long Run Individual and Overall Tax Elasticities
in Terms of the Parameters Included in the Model
Tax Yields  Tax Elasticities
A. Short Run:
Total Tax  $mamlPml+ 6dadlpdl(Yl+aclOcl72+Y3aol)+ 6c%clpcl+&oaol
(T)
-Import Tax  %mlpml
(Tm)
-Consumption  Tax  adlpdl(l+aclPcl72+Y73aol)
(Td)
-Corporate Income Tax  aclocl
(Ta)




6mamlfml  6d'tdlpdl  [  alcl72+  73aol 1  6caclcl  boaol
+  - x Xy +  +  1+  +
1- am2  1-Qd2  1 - ac2  1-o 2 J  1  -ac2  l-ao 2
-Import  Tax  amlpml
(Tm)
1-  am2
-Consumption  Tax  adlpdl  aclPcl72+ 73l1ol
(Td)  x  al +  - +
l-ad2  1  - %c2  1-ao2
-Corporate Income Tax  aclocl
(TC)
1  -ac2
-Other  Direct Taxes  aol
(To)
1-ao2- 41 -
Table 4: Direct and Indirect Responses of Individual and Overall Tax
Revenues to the Changes in the Domestic Consumption Tax System
Type of Tax  Percentage Changes in Tax Yields due to A7d=l%
A. Short Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  Sdad3
Indirect Response  6mamlfm262+&dadlO2(Pd2+72PdlaclPc3)+6cac1Pc382
-Import Tax
Indirect Response  Qmlflm202
-Consumption Tax
Direct Response  cad3
Indirect Response  adl62(pd2+ 72#dlaclfc3)
-Corporate Income Tax
Indirect Response  aclPc362
B. Long Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  6d(ad3)/(l - ad2)
Indirect Response
6d'dl 6 2  [  72Pdl%clfc3  6mamlfm262  6 cac%1c302
x  d2  +  +  +
1-cad2  L  - 'c2  1  - am2  1  - ac2
-Import  Tax
Indirect Response  (`mlfm2 02)/(l - dm2)
-Consumption  Tax
Direct Response  (ad3)/(l - td2)
Indirect  Response  adlO2  72  `dl%clfc3  1
x  fd2+
1~~  -lad2  1  2  JC
-Corporate Income Tax
Indirect Response  (aclPc3 62)/(1 - %c2)- 42  -
Table 5: Direct and Indirect Responses of Individual and Overall Tax
Revenues to Changes in the Import Tax System
Type of Tax  Percentage Changes in Tax Yields due to Arm=l%
A. Short Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  6mQm3
Indirect Response  6mamlPm2Gl+  Sdadl0l(Pd2+ Pdl2Y2acl/ 3c3)+ ScaclPc3Ol
-Import  Tax
Direct Response  am3
Indirect Response  amlPn281
-Consumption  Tax
Indirect Response  adl0l(Pd2+ PdlM2aclPc3)
-Corporate Income Tax
Indirect Response  aclfic3O1
B. Long Run ResRonse:
Total Tax
Direct Response  6m(am3)/(l - am2)
Indirect Response 6dodl 9l  r  %clc3fidl121] 6mmlfin2  Sc'clPc301
x  /d2+  ---  ---- +  +
1-id2  1 -ac22  1am2  1 -c2
-Import Tax
Direct Response  (am3)/(l - `m2)
Indirect Response  (am1Pm2Ol)/(l  - am2)
-Consumption Tax
Indirect Response  crdlOl  aclOc3fidl2
fx  d2+ -
1-'d2  1 - ac2
-Corporate Income Tax
Indirect Response  (QclPc3 0l)/(l  - ac2)- 43 -
Table 6: Direct and Indirect Responses of Individual  and Overall Tax
Revenues to the Changes in the Corporate Income  Tax System
Type of Tax  Pe.centage Changes in Tax Yields due to Arc=l%
A. Short Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  6ccc3
Indirect Response  6cQcl6c2 +  6dadlPdlY2(cclPc2 +  ac3) +6mamlOm3
-Import Tax
Indirect Response  amlPm3
-Consumption Tax
Indirect Response  adlPdly2(%clPc2 +  ac3)
-Corporate Income Tax
Direct Response  ac3
Indirect Response  %clPc2
B. Long Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  (6c%c3)/( 1 - ac2)
Indirect Response  6caclfc2  6dcdlPdl72(acl#c2 +  ac3)  amlfm3
=  ==_+  +
(1 - ac2)  (1 - ac2)(1 -ad2)  I-am2
-Import tax
Indirect Response  aml6m3/(l-m2)
-Consumption  Tax
Indirect Response  cdlPdl72(aclPc2 +  ac3)
(1  - ad2)( 1 - ac2)
-Corporate Income Tax
Direct Response  (ac3)/(l - ac2)
Indirect Resnonse  (aclPc2)/(l - 'c2)- 44 -
Table 7: Direct and Indirect Responses of Individual  and Overall Tax
Revenues to the Changes in  Other Direct Tax Systems
Type of Tax  PErcentage  Changes in  Tax Yields due to Arol%
A. Short Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  Soao3
Indirect Response  Soadlfdld3ao3
-Consumption  Tax
Indirect Response  adl6dl73ao3
-Other Direct taxes
Direct Response  ao3
B. Long Run Response:
Total Tax
Direct Response  (60ao3)/(l - a02)
Indirect Response  6oadlPdl73ao3
(1  - a 0 2 ) (1  - ckd2)
-Consumption  Tax
Indirect  Response  adlPdl3czO3
(1  - ad2)(1  - ao2)
-Other Direct Taxes
Direct Response  (ao3)/(l - ao2)- 45 -
where
i'il  -long-run elasticity of Ti with respect to GDP, and
Oij2-the long-run Response of Ti to one percentage point change in rj
The elements of ([I+B-lC]-l[-B-lD])  which are related to the
coefficients of ln(GDP)--the long run individual  and overall tax
elasticities--and r;s--the long run direct and indirect responses of tax
revenues to DTMs-- are presented in Tables 3-7.
To summarize, all the existing estimation methods of tax elasticity
suffer from a specification  bias which is created in the  process of dealing
with the lack of an observable quantitative  variable capable of reflecting
all changes in an individual (or  overall) tax system in public finance. The
estimation technique developed in this chapter is a dynamic simultaneous-
equation econometric model of taxation  which deals with this lack and thus,
with its consequences on the estimate of tax elasticity. That is: (i) as
representative of each individual tax system, its "average effective tax
rate net of endogenous changes in its tax yield and base" (AETRN) is
introduced in the model on which time series data are automatically
generated in the process of estimating the model parameters; (ii) this
model incorporates  both the direct and indirect  responses of each
individual tax yield to the changes in its own as well as other individual
tax systems, i.e., own-DTM direct, own-DTM indirect and cross-DTM indirect
responses; and (iii) its application requires only historical time series
data on individual tax revenues and bases and gross domestic products, all
of which are already available for  most countries.
The parapeters of the model are estimated by means of a
simultaneous-equation econometric technique.  Its impact and total- 46 -
multipliers (dynamic  multipliers) are then derived by solving it
respectively as an ordinary and a difference equations system. These
multipliers measure the short run and long run (i) elasticities of
individual tax yields, individual tax  bases and overall tax revenue  with
respect to CDP, and (ii)  responses of each individual tax yield and tax
base to the changes in its own and other individual tax systems.
In addition to its application as a method for estimating tax
elasticity and the revenue impact  of DTMs, this model can be used as an
empirical fiamework:
(1)  to forecast a government's revenue from various sources of
taxation;
(2)  to evaluate the  macroeconomic impact of a cax reform program which
is aimed at either generating additional revenue and/or dealing
with specific economic problems--this simply requires converting
the DTMs included in that reform into AETRNis (for  more details see
Appendix C); and
(3)  to deal with various tax related economic issues  which may require
further disaggregation of individual tax yields and bases--for
example, to investigate the welfare impact of  moving from
differer.tial  tariffs towards uniform ones, which is often
recommended  by the Bank, or to examine the controversial view that
uniform tariffs result in uniform rates of effective protection in
industrial and non-industrial activities.CHAPTER III
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
The  objective  of this  chapter  is  to  highlight  the  contribution  of
discretionary  tax  measures  to  trends  of tax  shares  and  tax  effort  in  two
SSA  countries  during  the  past  two  decades.  These  are  Malawi  and  Mautitius
which  have  exhibited  different  trends  in  an important  aspect  of public
finance,  that  is,  a shift  from  the  taxation  of international  trade  to  the
taxation  of  domestic  transactions  which  has  taken  place  in  Malawi  while,  in
Mauritius,  government's  reliance  on foreign  trade  taxes  has risen.  The
model  developed  in the  previous  chapter  is  econometrically  applied  to  the
time  series  data  of these  countries  in  order  to accomplish  this  aim.
In the  first  section,  the  estimation  method  and  results  are
discussed,  and  the  dynamic  multipliers  of the  model  are  derived.  Using  the
obtained  results,  the  trends  of tax  shares  and  effort  are  analyzed  in the
second  section.
Estimation  Method  and  Empirical  Results
Time  series  data  are  used  to estimate  the  parameters  of the  model.
These  data  and  their  corresponding  sources  are  supplied  in  the  Appendix  A.
Because  of  using  time  series  data,  there  is the  possibility  of the
presence  of serial  correlation.  If this  is  ignored,  the  estimate  of the
parameters  will  be (a)  inconsistent,  which  means  that  conducting  any  kind
of test  related  to  these  parameters  will  be unreliable,  and (b)  biased,- 48 -
that is, parameters of such an equation will be overestimated (or
underestimated) if the coefficient of the serial correlation is positive
(or  negative).1 To test the hypothesis of zero autocorreiation in the tax
base and tax yield equations, "DW"  and "h" statistics are respectively used
in this study. 2
To estimate these two statistics, the parameters of the model were
estimated by means of a non-linear two-stage least squares (N2SLS)  method.
All of the estimated parameters had the expected signs and plausible sizes
except those of the lagged  depender.c  variable in Malawi's domestic
consumption tax yield function and those of other direct tax and domestic
consumption tax equations of Mauritius,  which had contrary signs and were
insignificant.  These variables were dropped from those equations and the
model parameters re-estimated  by means of N2SLS.  Then, the estimation
results were used to calculate the "h"  and "DW" statistics  which are
presented in Table 8.
It is apparent from the information  supplied in this Table that the
hypothesis of zero serial  correlation is not rejected at the 5 percent
level in the domestic consumption tax yield and import tax base equations
1/ See Maddala (1987),  pp. 371-73.
2/ DW statistics are derived  under the assumption that regressors are fixed
(non-stochastic);  hence, they are not applicable in cases where some of
the regressors are lagged dependent  variables, such as the tax revenue
equations in the model developed in this study.  In such cases, "h"
statistics are applied  whose estimate is derived as follows:
h-p[n/  (l-na2)]0.5
where p-coefficient of serial correlation, n-number of observation and
a-sample standard deviation of coefficient of the lagged dependent
variables. This statistic  has standard  normal distribution and the null
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is rejected at the 5 percent
significance level if h >  1.64; for more details see Durbin (1970).of Malawi.  The  test  is inconclusive  in the  import  and  corporate  income  tax
base functions  of  Mauritius.
The following  procedure  was  used to  deal  with this  econometric
problem  in these  equations.  Using  the  first-order  autocorrelation  scheme,
Table  8:  Test  Results  for  Serial  Correlation
Equations  Malawi  Mauritius
DW  h  DW  h
Tax  Revenue  Block:
Import Tax  --  2.54  --  2.07
Consumption  Tax  0.512*  - 1.86  -
Corporate Income Tax  - 1.70  - 2.72
Other Direct Tax  - 1.84  1.77
Tax  Base  Block:
Import  Tax  0.940*  - 1.16**
Consumption  Tax  1.65  1.98
Corporate  Income  Tax  1.54  3.04**
*  Hypothesis  of no serial  correlation  is  not  rejected.
**The  test  is inconclusive.
the  original  equation  was  lagged  one  period.  Both  sides  of thie  equation
were then  multiplied  by the  coefficient  of serial  correlation  (p)  whose
estimate  is  unknown;  its  subtraction  from  the  original  equatior  produced  a
new equation  in  which  disturbance  terms  were  not  correlated  pairwisely.
Finally,  this  new  equation  was  replaced  by the  original  one  in the  process
of estimation.
After  correcting  for  serial  correlation,  the  efticient  and
consistent  estimates  of  r,arameters  of the  model  as  a difference  equations- 50 -
system  were obtained  by means  of a  non-linear  3SLS  technique.  The  N3SLS
estimation  results--the  stzuctural  form  of the  models  with estimated
parameters--for  Malawi  and  Mauritius  respectively  are  presented  in  lables  9
and  10.
In  order  to test  the  goodness-of-fit  of the  entire  estimated  model
a  within-sample  dynamic  simul&tion  was  performed  for  all  of the  endogenous
variables.  A comparison  of the  actual  and  simulated  values  gives  an
indication  of  whether  the  model  is able  to  capture  the  historical  behavior
of the  endogcnous  variables.  The  simulated  and  actual  values  of the
individual  tax  yields  (logs)  for  Malawi  and  Mauritius  respectively  are
shown  in figures  2a-2d  and  3a-3d.  These  charts  indicate  that  these  models
are  fairly  accurate  in  capturing  the  historical  movements  of those
variables.  The  coefficients  of determination  and  mean-sum  of squares  of
errors  presented  in  Tables  9 and  10  support  the  goodness-of-fits  observed
in Figures  2a-2d  and  3a-3d.
The  estimated  coefficients  of all  of the  explanatory  variables  in
these  models  have  the  expected  signs  and  plausible  sizes.  All are
significantly  different  from  zero  at  more  than  95  percent  probability  level
except  (a)  those  of ris  in the  corporate  income  tax  base  equation  of
Malawi--these  being  significantly  different  from  zero  at the  85  percent
probability  level--and  (b)  the  adjustment  coefficients  of the  Tm and  To in
this  country--these  being  significantly  equal  to  one.
Consequently,  in  both  countries,  discretionary  tax  measures  have  had
a significant  impact  on  both  individual  tax  revenues  and  bases  during  the
past two  decades.  This  means  that  the  market  mechanism  works  fairly  well in
these  countries  and  that  tax  policy  has  been  an effective  policy  instrument- 51 -
Table 9: Econometric Model of Taxation in  Malawi
(N3SLS Estimation Results)
Equations included in the model*
Stochastic Equations:
ln(Tm)t- -2.726  + 0.8981n(Xm)t+ 0.0191n(Tm)t.l+  0.081(rm)t  R2-0.987
(-10.81)  (14.41)  (0.43)  (12.23)  MSE=0.0025
ln(Td)t- -3.623  + 0.9051n(Xd)t+ 0 .194(7d)t  R2-0.961
(-2.2)  (3.11)  (15.77)  MSE=0.0173
ln(Tc)t- -3.261  + 0.8521n(Xc)t+ 0.1291n(Tc)t-l+ 0.141(rc)t  R2-0.992
(-9.51) (10.96)  (2.26)  (8.44)  MSE=0.0022
ln(TO)t= -4.485  + 0.9601n(GDP)t+  0.0271n(TO)t-l+ 0 .380(rot)t  R2=0.998
(-32.1)  (34.3)  (1.35)  (32.5)  MSE=0.0001
ln(Xm)t- +0.394 + 0.6311n(GDP)t- 0.030(rm/rd)t+ 0 .073(rc)t  R2 -0.966
(1.23)  (5.41)  (-1.88)  (2.45)  MSE-0.0111
ln(Xd)t= -0.033  + 1.0211n(Yd)t+  0.024(7m/rd)t  R2=0.982
(-2.10)  (42.7)  (4.02)  MSE=0.0038
ln(Xc)t= -1.09  + 1.lllln(GDP)t-  0 .014(rc)t+ 0.0047 (Tr/rd)t  R2=0.990
(-11.4)  (65.4)  (-1.67)  (1.34)  MSE=0.0014
Identities:
ln(T)t= 1.41 + 0.286n(Tm)t+ 0.2921n(Td)t + 0.2421n(Tc)t+ 0.1801n(TO)t
ln(Yd)t= -0.29  + 1.0661n(GDP)t- 0.0381n(Tco)t- 0.0271n(TO)t
(rm/rd)t- 1.845 +0.08(rm)t - 0.271(Td)t
*  Within parentheses are "t" statistics; MSE-mean squares errors; ris are
in percentage form.- 52 -
Table 10: Econometric  Model of Taxation in  Mauritius
(N3SLS  Estimation Results)
Equations included in the model*
Stochastic Equations:
ln(Tm)t- -1.643 + 0.6831n(Xm)t+ 0.2311n(Tm)t-l+ 0.048(rm)t  R2 -0.998
(-6.30)  (10.41)  (4.22)  (8.53)  MSE-0.0001
ln(Td)t- -3.817  + 0.9981n(Xd)t + 0 .169(rd)t  R2C0.999
(-236.4) (429.5)  (83.7)  MSE-0.00004
ln(TC)t  -3.68b  + 0.8281n(Xc)t+ 0.0951n(Tc)t-l+ 0.330(rc)t  R2 -0.992
(-7.91)  (10.1)  (1.44)  (8.31)  MSE=0.0089
ln(TO)t- -3.965  + 0.9721nkGDP)t+ 0 .223(rot)t  R2=0.997
(-31.6)  (69.7)  (23.9)  MSE=0.0022
ln(Xm)t- -1.844  + 1.1571n(GDP)t-  0 091(rm/rd)t+ 0.047(rc)t  R2 -0.994
(-1.12)  (50.9)  (-2.30)  (3.44)  MSE=0.0066
ln(Xd)t- 2.296 + 0.763Ln(Yd)t+ 0.088(7m/Td)t  R20.996
(1.19)  (8.62)  (2.51)  MSE-0.0041
ln(Xc)t- -0.258 + 0.9931n(GDP)t- 0. 020(rc)t+  0.095(rm/rd)t  R20.999
(-2.85)  (83.2)  (-3.41)  (6.43)  MSE=0.0009
Identities:
ln(T)t- 1.25 + 0.5041n(Tm)t+ 0.1551n(Td)t  + 0.0991n(Tc)t+ 0.2451n(TO)t
ln(Yd)t- -0.258  + 1.0561n(GDP)t- 0.0201n(Tc)t-  0.0361n(TO)t
(Tm/fd)t  2.99 + 0.06(rm)t - 0.54(7d)t
*  Within parentheses are "t" statistics;  MSE=mean squares errors; ris are
in percentage form.- 53 -
Figures 2a-2d: Actual and Predicted Values of Individual
Tax  Yields in  Malawi (1965-85)
a:  Import  Tax  b: Dan.  Commptiou  tax
:Corporate  Income Ta  d: Other direct Taxes
a  Actual tax yield  Predicted tax  yield- 54  -
Figures 3a-3d: Actual and Predicted  Values of Individual
Tax Yields in Mauritius (1965-85)
I:  mport Tax  b:  Don.  Cousimption  Tax
66.  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  .
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
*  e  - u  a.a  X  a  a-
c:  Corporate  Income  Tax  d:  Other  Direct  Taxes
~~~~~~~~~~~'m
40.~~~~~~~e
a*Actua  t  yield  *  ee  *  e  *ld
*  Actual  tax  yield  __  Predicted  Ta  x  ield- 55
in  mobilizing  resources  from  the  private  sector  to the  public  sector.  This
result  strongly  rejects  the  view  that  mobilizing  resources  through  the  tax
system  has  been  difficult  in  SSA  countries  (see  Shalizi  and  Squire).
Tables  9  and 10  respectively  presented  the  structural  form  of the
models  with estimated  parameters  for  Malawi  and  Mauritius.  Using  the  method
explained  in Chapter  II,  each  of these  models  was  solved  as  ordinary  and
difference  equations  systems  in  order  to estimate  the  short  run  and  long
run impacts  of changes  in  exogenous  variables,  ln(GDP)  and  ris,  on
endogenous  ones,  individual  tax  yields  and  bases  and  total  tax  revenue.  The
obtained  results  for  Malawi  and  Mauritius  are  respectively  presented  in
Tables  11  and 12 --where  built-in  elasticity  of tax  yields  and  bases  with
respect  to  GDP  are  supplied  in  column  (a)  and  columns  (b)-(e)  represent  the
responses  of each  of the  tax  yields  and  bases  to the  changes  in  each  of the
individual  tax  systems  (Ari-l)  included  in the  model.
It is revealed  from  column  (a)  that  the  total  and  individual  tax
revenues  are  inelastic  with  respect  to  GDP  except  for import  tax  yield  in
Mauritius  and  corporate  income  tax  revenue  in  Malawi  whose  long  run
elasticities  exceed  one.  These  exceptions  emerge  from the  fact  that  imports
in  Mauritius  and  value  added  in  the  non-agriculture  sector  in  Malawi  grow
faster  than  GDP.  In other  words,  these  two  individual  taxes  are  still
inelastic  with respect  to  their  corresponding  economic  tax  bases (0.78  and
0.91  respectively).
The  data  presented  in  columns  (b)  and (c)  indicate  that  the  overall
response  of the  total  tax  revenue  to  a one  percentage  point  increase  in  Tm
is  larger  than  its  direct  response  in  both  countries. This  is due  to the
fact  that  a rise  in rm reduces  imports  but  raises  private  consumption  and- 56 -
Table  11:  Short  Run  and  Long  Run  Impact  of Changes  in Individual  Tax
Systems  and  GDP  on  Tax  Revenues  and  Bases  in  Malawi*
Tax  Revenues  and  Aln(GDP)-l%  ATm-l  Ard- 1 A  1ro-
Bases  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
A.Short  Run  Impacts:
Aln(T)  0.8336  0.0229  0.0567  0.0486  0.0657
(0.0232) (0.0566) (0.0341) (0.0684)
Aln(Tm)  0.5666  0.0788  0.0073  0.0656  0.0000
(0.0810)
Aln(Td)  0.9295  0.0017  0.1881  -0.0042  -0.0091
(0.1940)
Aln(T.)  0.9466  0.0003  -0.0011  0.1291  0.0000
(0.1410)
tln(TO)  0.9600  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.3800
(0.3800)
Aln(Xm)  0.6310  -0.0024  0.0081  0.0730  0.0000
Aln(Xd)  1.0270  0.0019  -0.0065  -0.0046  -0.0101
Aln(XC)  1.1110  0.0004  -0.0013  -0.0140  0.0000
B.Long  Run  Impacts:
Aln(T)  0.8740  0.0233  0.0567  0.0534  0.0676
(0.0236) (0.0567) (0.0392) (0.0703)
Aln(Tm)  0.5776  0.0804  0.0074  0.0668  0.0000
(0.0826)
Aln(Td)  0.9243  0.0017  0.1882  -0.0048  -0.0094
(0.1940)
Aln(TC)  1.0868  0.0004  -0.0012  0.1482  0.0000
(0.1619)
Aln(TO)  0.9866  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.3905
(0.3905)
Aln(Xm)  0.6310  -0.0024  0.0081  0.0730  0.0000
Aln(Xd)  1.0213  0.0019  -0.0065  -0.0053  -0.0104
Aln(Xc)  1.1110  0.0004  -0.0013  -0.0140  0.0000
F  Within  the  parentheses  is the  direct  response  of tax  revenue  to the  DTMs.57 -
Table  12:  Short  Run  and  Long  Run Impacts  of Changes  in Individual  Tax
Systems  and  GDP  on  Tax  Yields  and  Bases  in  Mauritius*
Tax  Revenues  and  Aln(GDP)-1%  Arm- 1 A?dl  Arc-l  ArO-
Bases  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
A.Short  Run  Impacts:
Aln(T)  0.8364  0.0237  0.0317  0.0465  0.0537
(0.0328) (0.0262) (0.0327) (0.0546)
Aln(Tm)  0.7902  0.0445  0.0336  0.0321  0.0000
(0.0650)
Aln(Td)  0.7649  0.0052  0.1221  -0.0048  -0.0061
(0.169)
Aln(TC)  0.8222  0.0047  -0.0426  0.3134  0.0000
(0.3300)
Aln(TO)  0.9720  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.2230
(0.2230)
Aln(Xm)  1.1570  -0.0055  0.0492  0.0470  0.0000
Aln(Xd)  0.7665  0.0052  -0.0470  -0.0048  -0.0061
Aln(Xc)  0.9930  0.0057  -0.0514  -0.2000  0.0000
B.Long  Run Impacts:
Aln(T)  0.9644  0.0305  0.0363  0.0545  0.0537
(0.0426)  (0.0262)  (0.0361)  (0.0546)
Aln(Tm)  1.0276  0.0578  0.0437  0.0417  0.0000
(0.0845)
Aln(Td)  0.7636  0.0052  0.1222  -0.0053  -0.0061
(0.1690)
Aln(TC)  0.9085  0.0052  -0.0470  0.3463  0.0000
(0.3650)
Aln(TO)  0.9720  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.2230
(0.2230)
Aln(Xm)  1.1570  -0.0055  0.0492  0.0470  0.0000
Aln(Xd)  0.7652  0.0052  -0.0469  -0.0053  -0.0061
Aln(Xc)  0.9930  0.0057  -0.0514  -0.0200  0.0000
§  Within  the  parentheses  is  the  direct  response  of tax  revenue  to  the  DTMs.- 58 -
hence,  value-added  in the  non-agriculture  sector. As a result,  import  tax
declines  and  domestic  consumption  and  corporate  income  taxes  rise,  causing
a  net indirect  increase  in  total  tax  revenue. This  process  is reversed
when rd  rises,  that  is,  the  overall  response  of the  total  tax  revenue  to  a
one  percentage  point  rise  in  rd falls  short  of its  direct  response  in  both
countries.
As far  as changes  in corporate  income  and  other  direct  taxes  are
concerned,  an increase  in  rc indirectly  raises  import  tax  and  reduces
domestic  consumption  and  corporate  income  tax  yields,  resulting  in  a
decline  in  the  direct  response  of the  total  tax  yield  to r Tc  This  process
is reversed  when ro rises.
It is  worth  mentioning  that,  in  Malawi,  the  elasticity  of the
domestic  consumption  tax  revenue  with  respect  to  GDP  is  higher  than  that  of
the  import  tax  yield  while,  in  Mauritius,  the  former  falls  short  of the
latter. Furthermore,  in  Malawi,  the  direct  revenue  impact  of changes  in
the  domestic  consumption  tax  system  is  much  higher  than  that  of the  same
changes  in the  import  tax  system  while,  in  Mauritius,  the  former  is  smaller
than  the  latter. These  differences  will  obviously  require  a different
reform  combination  of discretionary  tax  measures  if  such  a reform  is  aimed
at shifting  from  the  taxation  of international  trade  to the  taxation  of
domestic  transactions  in these  countries.
Trends  of Tax  shares  and  Tax  Effort
During  the  1965-1985  period,  the  tax  effort  (total  tax  revenue  over
GDP)  has grown  by an  annual  average  rate  of  4.6  percent  in  Malawi  and 1.4- 59 -
percent in Mauritius. The share of domestic consumption in total tax
revenue 4n Malawi has increased  by an average annual rate of 2.56 percent
and that of import tax yield has declined by 1.72 percent.  In Mauritius,
the trends of these shares  have been reversed, recording average annual
percentage changes of -0.62 and +1.83 respectively.  As a result, the ratio
of domestic consumption tax over import tax, measuring the size and
direction of shift from the taxation of imports  to the taxation of domestic
transactions has changed by +4.3 and -2.4  percent per annum in these
countries respectively.3
The time series data generated on ris reveal that fiscal
authorities have taken a variety of discretionary tax measures in both
countries during the same period, to the extent that rm' Td, rc and ro have
increased respectively by average annual percentage points of 0.49, 0.44,
0.91 and 0.03 in Malawi and 0.45, 0.10, -0.02 and zero in Mauritius.
Furthermore, nominal GDP has grown by an average annual rate of 12 percent
in  Malawi and 14 percent in Mauritius.4
It is important to isolate the contribution of DTMs from that of
economic growth to the trends of tax effort and tax shares in these
ccuntries, as it makes it possible to explore the role that DTMs have
played in effecting the shift from the taxation of imports to the taxation
of domestic transactions in  Malawi, and to question the effectiveness of
DTMs as a policy instrument for bringing about such a shift in Mauritius.
To  accomplish this aim, first, the built-in elasticity of each of these
trends  with respect to GDP is derived using the individual and overall tax
3/ Tables 2-7 in Appendix A.
4/ Tables 2-7 in Appendix A.- 60 -
elasticities estimated in the previous section. Then, their buoyancies are
estimated using the estimate of the individual  and overall tax buoyancies
presented in Table 13, and finally, the contribution of DTMs to each of
these trends is calculated by subtracting the elasticity of that trend from
its  buoyancy.
The built-in elasticity of each of these trends is the difference
between the built-in elasticities of the variables appearing in its
numerator and denominator, that is,
[Aln(Ti/T)I/[Aln(GDP)]  - pi  - (i)
[Aln(T/GDP)I/[Aln(GDP)]  - p  - 1  (ii)
[Aln(Td/Tm)]/[Aln(GDP)]  - Ad - Pm  (iii)
where
i= d, domestic consumption tax,
- m, import tax,
- c, corporate income tax,
-o,  other direct taxes,
pj= built-in elasticity of the ith individual tax yield, and
p -built-in  elasticity of overall tax revenue.
Using the estimates of p  and pis presented in Table 13, the built-in
elasticities of these tren.ds--measuring  their automatic response to
variations in  GDP--were estimated by means of equations (i), (ii)  and
(iii).  The results are presented in Table 14.
Similarly, the buoyancy of each of them is the difference between
the buoyancies of the variables appearing in its numerator and denominator,
that is,. 61 -
tAln(Ti/T)*]/[Aln(GDP)]  - (  '  (i)
[Aln(T/GDP)*]/[Aln(GDP)]-  - 1  (ii)
[Aln(Td/T.)*]/[Aln(GDP)]-  Cd -m  (iii)
where
buoyancy of overall tax revenue, and
(i  buoyancy of the ith individual tax yield.
Using estimates of 4  and eis presented in Table 13, the buoyancy of these
trends--measuring their total response, including the impact of DTMs, to
variations in GDP--were estimated  by means of equations (i)', (ii)' and
(iii)'.  The results are presented in  'fable  14.
Table 13: Individual  and Overall Tax Elasticities
and Buoyancies in Malawi and Mauri.tius
Malawi  Mauritius
Buoyancyl  Elasticity 2 Buoyancyl  Elasticity 2
Total Tax  1.31  0.88  1.09  0.97
Import Tax  1.06  0.58  1.19  1.03
Consumption Tax  1.72  0.92  1.05  0.76
Corporate Income Tax  1.43  1.09  0.97  0.91
Other Direct Taxes  1.09  0.99  0.95  O.27
I/ Tax Buoyancies were obtained by estimating the parameters of the
following econometric model.
ln(Ti)t-wo  +  wiln(GDP)t +  ut
where wi is buoyancy.
2/ From Tables 11 and 12.- 62 -
Finally, by subtracting the elasticity of each of these trends from
its buoyancy, the contribution  of DTMs to that trend was estimated in terms
of variations in GDP. The results are presented in Table 14.
It is revealed from this Table that the growth of tax effort has
been mainly due to discretionary tax  measures, to the extent that tax
effort would fall in the absence of these measures during the period under
review. This result is in strong opposition to the view that  mooilizing
resources from the private sector to the public sector through the tax
system has been difficult in SSA countries.
In Malawi, 88 percent of the overall growth rate of domestic
consumption tax share  has emerged from discretionary tax measures while, in
Mauritius, economic growth has dominated the trend of this tax share,
contributing 500 percent to its overall negative growth rate.
Economic growth has been the principal contribuLor to the downward
trend of import tax share in Malawi.  Its contribution accounts for 116
percent of the overall average annual percentage decline in this tax share.
In Mauritius, both discretionary tax  measures and economic growth  have
significantly contributed to the overall growth rate of import tax share,
out of which 40 percent has emerged from the former factor and 60 percent
has come from the latter one.
It is apparent from the information  presenced in Table 14 that the
contribution of discretionary tax measures to the trend of domestic tax
share has been higher than its contribution to the trend of import tax
share in both countries. This simply  means that  both countries would shift
from the taxation of international  trade to the taxation  of domestic
transactions in the absence of any change in GDP. However, due to- 63 -
Table  14:  Contribution  of Discretionary  Tax  Measures  and  Economic  Growvh
to  Trends  of Tax  Shares  and  Effort  in  Malawi  & Mauritius
(percentage  changes)
Contribition  of




Tax  Effort  +0.31  -0.12  +0.43
Import  Tax  Share  -0.25  -0.29  +0.04
Domestic  Consumption
Tax  Share  +0.41  +0.05  +0.36
Corporate  Income  Tax  Share  +0.10  +0.21  -0.11
Other  Direct  Tax Share  -0.21  +0.11  -0.33
Domestic  Consumption  Tax  over  +0.66  +0.34  +0.32
Import  Tax
Mauritius:
Tax  Effort  +0.09  -0.03  +0.11
Import  Tax  Share  +0.10  +0.06  +0.04
Domestic  Consumption
Tax  Share  -0.04  -0.20  +0.16
Corporate  Income  Tax  Share  -0.12  -0.06  -0.06
Other  Direct  Taxes  Share  -0.14  +0.01  -0.15
Domestic  Consumption  Tax  over  -0.14  -0.26  +0.12
Import  Tax- 64
structural  differences  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  this  shift  has
been  accelerated  in  Malawi  and  has  been  reversed  in  Mauritius.  In  Malawi,
economic  growth  and  discretionary  tax  measures  have  played  almost  equal
roles  in shifting  from  the  taxation  of international  trade  to  the  taxation
of domestic  transactions;  they  have  contributed  51  and  49 percent
respectively  to the  overall  growth  in  domestic  consumption  tax-import  tax
ratio.  In  Mauritius,  ecoromic  growth  has  dominated  the  downward  trend  of
this  ratio,  indicating  that  this  trend  can  be reversed  only  by means  of an
appropriate  combination  of discretionary  tax  measures.- 65 -
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The structural adjustment programs of developing countries use
fiscal deficit reduction as one of the policy tools for achieving real
economic growth with price stability and balance of payments viability. In
dealing with this deficit  within such a framework, projections  need to be
made of the additional revenues which can be mobilized within the existing
tax system as GDP grows. These projections indicate the need to activate
additional means of revenue generation, particularly politically difficult
discretionary tax  measures. Thus, it becomes essential to be able to
estimate built-in tax elasticity  which measures percentage increases in tax
revenue resulting from the endogenous changes in the base caused by a one
percent rise in CDP. However, its estimation  by means of any of the
existing methods suffers from a specification  bias due to lack of an
obervable quantitative variable capable of reflecting all changes in an
individual (or overall) tax system in public finance.
The central theme of this study has been twofold: first, to develop
an econometric method of estimating tax elasticity and the revenue impact
of DTMs which deals with this lack and, thus,  with its consequences on the
estimate of tax elasticity; and second, to use this model as an empirical
framework to highlight the contribution of DTMs to trends of tax effort and
tax shares in selected SSA countries during the past two decades.
The method to be developed in this research is a dynamic
simultaneous-equation macroeconometric  model of taxation which captures the- 66 -
interaction of individual tax systems, individual tax revenues and bases
and GDP. As representative of each individual tax system, its "average
effective tax rate net of endogenous (built-in)  changes in the tax yield
and base" (AETRN) is introduced into the model. Time series data on AETRNs
are automatically generated in  the process of estimating the model
parameters. This model explicitly incorporates  both the direct and indirect
responses of each individual tax revenue to changes in its own and other
individual tax systems, i.e., own-DTM direct, own-DTM indirect and cross-
DTM indirect responses. Its application requires only historical time
series data on tax revenues, tax bases and GDP, all of which are already
available for most countries.
In addition to its application as a method for estimating  tax
elasticity and the revenue impact of DTMs, this model can be used as an
empirical framework:
(a) to forecast a government's revenue from various sources of taxation;
(b) to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of a tax reform program which is
aimed at either generating additional revenue and/or dealing with
specific economic problems; and
(c) to deal with various tax related economic issues--for  example, to
investigate the welfare impact of moving from differential tariffs
towards uniform ones, which is often recommended  by the Bank, or
to examine the controversial  view that  uniform tariffs result in
uniform rates of effective protection in industrial and non-
industrial activities.
A shift from the taxation of international trade to the taxation of
domestic transactions is recommended,  by both the Bank and the Fund, as one- 67 -
of the main objectives oL  a tax reform program in most developing
countries. Such a reform is often included in structural adjustment
programs. The presumption is that discretionary tax measures play a crucial
role in effecting this shift. However, there is evidence indicating that
this shift is also affected by endogenous changes in tax bases caused by
factors other than these measures, particularly economic growth. The model
developed in this study has been used as an empirical tool 'n  order (i) to
highlight the contribution that discretionary tax measures have made to the
shift from the taxation of international  trade to the taxation o, domestic
transactions in the countries, such as Malawi, where such a shift has taken
place, and (ii) to question the effectiveness of these measures as a policy
instrument for bringing about such a shift in other countries, such as
Mauritius, where the country's reliance orL  the foreign trade tax has risen
during the past two decades.
The econometric application of the model to the time series data of
these countries yields a number of interesting  results, for example:
(a) Discretionary tax measures have been an effective policy instrument
for  mobilizing resources from the  private sector to the public sector
in both countries, to the extent that tax effort would decline in the
absence of DTMs.  This result is strongly opposed to the view that
mobilizing resources through the tax system has been difficult in SSA
countries.
(b) Individual and overall tax revenues  have been inelastic  with respect
to GDP in both countries except corporate income tax in  Malawi and
import tax in  Mauritius whose long run built-in elasticities exceed
one.  These exceptions emerge from the fact that imports in Mauritius- 68 -
and value added in non-agriculture  sector in Malawi have grown faster
than GDP; in other words, these two individual taxes are still
inelastic  with respect to their corresponding tax base.
(c) The built-in elasticity of domestic consumption tax has exceeded that
of import tax in  Malawi while, in Mauritius, the former has fallen
short of the latter.  Therefore, economic growth has contributed to
the shift from the taxation of imports to the taxation of domestic
transactions in Malawi and has had a negative impact on this shift in
Mauritius.
(d)  The contribution of discretionary tax measures to the trend of
domestic consumption tax share  has been higher than its contribution
to the trend of import tax share in both countries. This simply means
that both countries would shift from the taxation of imports to the
taxation of domestic transactions in the absence of economic growth.
However, due to the structural differences  mentioned above, economic
growth accelerated such a shift in Malawi and reversed it in
Mauritius.
(e) Finally, economic growth and discretionary tax measures have had
almost equal roles in the shift from the taxation of international
trade to the taxation of domestic transactions in  Malawi,contributing
51 and 49 percent to the overall growth rate of domestic consumption
tax-import tax ratio respectively.  In Mauritius, economic growth has
been the principal factor 'n  reversing this shift, to the extent that
this country would shift from the taxation  of international trade to
the taxation of domestic transactions in the absence of nominal
economic growth.- 69 -
The low degree of automatic responsiveness  of tax yields to
variations in GDP (tax elasticity) in these countries raises the following
interesting question, which demands further research:
"Is there any way to improve  the elasticity of these inelastic
tax systems and, hence, gradually to reduce the need to take
politically difficult discretionary tax  measures?"
This is a major gap remaining in the design of a tax reform. 5 It is an
empirical matter which demands country-specific and/or cross-country
analysis of trends of individual  and overall tax elasticities.  The model
developed in this study can be used as an empirical tool to conduct such
research.
Furthermore, it has been recognized,  both by the Bank and the Fund,
that most LDCs are in need of tax reform. A proper design of such reform,
however, requires quantitative information  on the impact of changes in each
individual tax system not only on its correspondirg tax revenue and base
but also on the other individual tax yields and bases. Providing such
information has been a complicated issue due to the lack of a satisfactory
empirical framework. The model developed in this research is capable of
producing this information.  However, the generated information is at a
highly aggregated level. That is, it provides estimates of impact of
overall changes in each individual tax system on its corresponding and
other individual tax bases and revenues,  but it is not directly capable of
disaggregating these impacts in terms of the various sources of changes in
that individual tax system, such as changes in the statutory tax rate, tax
5/ See Shome (1987).- 70 -
base, tax credits, tax allowances and tax administrative  efficiency.
Providing such disaggregated information demands further effort.APPENDiX A: HISTORICAL TIME SERIES DATA
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Table 1: Trends of Tax Shares, Tax Bases and Tax Effort in
Sub-Saharan  Africa Countries
(annual average percentage point changes)
Trends
A. Tax Effort  +0.40
B. Tax Shares
-Corporate Income Tax  +0.32
-Domestic  Consumption Tax  +0.15





-Domestic  Consumption Tax
Cp/CDP  +0.30





W  Vi-value added in industry sector, Vn-value added in  non-agriculture
sector, Cp=private consumption, C-government consumption, Mc-consumption
goods import,M-total imports, and GDP-gross domestic products.
Sources: For A Ehdaie, Gandhi and Shalizi and for B World Development
Report 1987, pp. 16, 172, 212.- 73  -
Table 2 :  Individual and Overall Tax Revenues in  Malawi
(000 000)
Tax on  Corporate  Other
Total  Import  Export  Domestic  Income  Direct
Year  Tax  Tax  Tax  transactions  Tax  Taxes
1965  11.8  4.2  0.0  2.4  1.8  3.4
1966  16.2  7.1  0.0  2.8  2.6  3.7
1967  19.1  8.9  0.0  1.9  4.2  4.1
1968  20.9  8.9  0.0  2.2  5.2  4.6
1969  27.5  11.1  0.0  3.9  6.1  6.4
1970  28.2  9.3  0.0  7.0  6.1  5.8
1971  36.1  10.6  0.0  11.4  7.7  6.5
1972  39.3  10.3  0.0  12.7  9.1  7.1
1973  43.6  10.6  0.0  14.3  10.5  8.1
1974  53.8  13.6  0.0  18.5  12.8  9.0
1975  66.6  14.9  0.0  21.1  20.3  10.3
1976  73.2  13.3  0.0  24.6  24.2  11.1
1977  89.9  16.3  0.0  30.4  29.5  13.7
1978  121.9  25.8  0.0  38.8  38.9  18.4
1979  143.9  32.7  0.0  51.8  38.1  21.3
1980  166.9  42.1  0.0  59.8  39.5  25.6
1981  178.9  50.2  0.0  66.7  34.1  27.9
1982  207.7  52.5  0.0  75.6  45.2  34.4
1983  240.0  58.5  0.0  87.5  53.3  40.7
1984  296.3  66.6  0.0  112.3  72.2  45.2
1985  367.1  92.6  0.0  124.7  102.3  47.5
Sources:  NA data file of Bank Economic and Social Data Base; GFS
data file of IMF; Country Economic Memorandums, World
Bank; and Recent Economic Development Report, IMF.- 74 -
Table 3 :  Individual and Total Tax Bases in Malawi
(000'000)
Value
Private  Added in
Year  GDPMP  Import  Consumption  Export  Non-Ag.
1965  157.3  54.5  137.7  85.3  31.9
1966  176.1  69.4  152.5  100.6  40.0
1967  184.6  68.2  156.9  109.4  47.0
1968  193.2  80.0  167.2  117.7  48.7
1969  206.5  87.7  179.9  129.1  52.0
1970  225.8  94.8  176.3  142.9  58.7
1971  281.7  107.7  236.9  178.5  71.2
1972  302.5  123.5  248.6  187.1  75.8
1973  339.1  136.8  270.0  222.3  100.6
1974  429.5  179.8  320.2  283.1  129.3
1975  493.7  243.1  365.2  336.0  154.3
1976  574.1  237.9  416.6  378.9  186.3
1977  681.3  252.1  483.4  430.0  218.4
1978  736.1  329.2  502.2  505.8  185.7
1979  747.4  380.4  577.0  532.3  209.7
1980  913.0  410.5  714.3  696.1  269.7
1981  986.9  348.6  773.4  758.6  284.4
1982  1114.3  359.3  835.7  837.4  280.2
1983  1288.9  407.1  979.8  965.3  298.2
1984  1509.4  433.6  1150.4  1115.5  478.6
1985  1807.0  568.2  1409.5  1360.8  475.0
Source: NA data file of Bank Economic and Social Data
Base.- 75 -
Table 4 :  Individual and Total Tax Revenues in Mauritius
(000'000)
Tax on  Corporate  Other
Total  Import  Export  Domestic  Income  Direct
Year  Tax  Tax  Tax  transaction  Tax  Taxes
1965  200.4  56.2  12.9  35.4  na  na
1966  146.9  52.3  15.2  38.6  12.0  28.8
1967  161.5  56.6  13.4  41.8  13.8  35.9
1968  174.8  62.2  15.3  43.7  18.0  35.6
1969  182.6  64.1  14.6  47.8  17.6  38.5
1970  179.0  63.8  16.8  48.2  14.3  35.9
1971  204.2  73.8  18.7  50.1  23.2  38.4
1972  234.2  86.6  19.6  55.7  24.7  47.6
1973  313.0  107.1  29.9  82.9  36.2  56.9
1974  439.8  141.6  48.2  108.1  59.1  82.8
1975  660.0  187.8  129.8  123.0  92.5  126.9
1976  946.5  260.5  126.1  136.3  138.8  284.8
1977  1072.9  349.1  124.9  173.3  224.0  201.6
1978  1109.5  412.7  139.8  220.2  132.2  204.6
1979  1260.7  469.9  145.2  271.1  128.4  246.1
1980  1601.5  647.4  287.3  319.8  118.5  228.5
1981  1801.1  713.4  268.2  373.4  180.9  260.2
1982  1953.4  701.0  377.8  420.7  162.7  291.2
1983  2436.5  1001.1  416.4  538.9  146.9  333.2
1984  2802.7  1174.4  442.0  667.4  154.3  364.6
1985  2993.0  1375.7  369.9  716.2  134.9  396.3
1986  3502.3  1740.6  459.3  788.1  169.0  345.3
Sources:  NA data file of Bank Economic and Social Data Base; GFS
data file of IMF; Country Economic Memoranda, World
Bank; and Recent Economic Development Report, IMF.76 -
Table 5 :Individual  and Total Tax Bases in Mauritius
(000'000)
Value
Private  Added in
Year  GDPmp  Import  consumption  Export  Non-Ag.
1965  976.3  435.0  799.8  933.3  393.0
1966  963.0  402.0  814.1  927.6  392.0
1967  1024.1  435.0  842.9  984.7  378.0
1968  1011.2  479.0  870.4  988.6  452.0
1969  1088.0  449.0  863.5  1047.7  475.0
1970  1099.8  515.0  924.6  1063.2  531.0
1971  1218.4  583.0  1042.0  1165.8  523.0
1972  1516.7  722.0  1165.6  1415.7  759.0
1973  1951.1  1037.0  1441.0  1803.0  991.0
1974  3471.8  1902.0  2237.7  2784.3  2124.0
1975  3563.4  2227.0  2466.0  3233.8  2269.0
1976  4181.1  2712.0  2956.0  3766.0  2388.0
1977  4794.7  3235.0  3658.0  4503.0  2656.0
1978  5485.3  3477.0  4249.0  5281.0  2705.0
1979  6753.8  4158.0  5144.0  6416.0  3260.0
1980  7442.5  5342.0  6562.0  7783.0  4450.0
1981  8849.0  5634.0  7277.0  8952.0  4566.0
1982  10225.5  5859.0  8301.0  10195.0  5529.0
1983  10806.6  5999.0  8874.0  11298.0  5953.0
1984  12076.2  7470.0  9841.0  12624.0  6989.0
1985  14155.2  9210.0  11127.0  14494.0  8885.0
1986  15812.0  10515.0  12090.0  16405.0  11880.0
Source: The same as Table 4.77 -
Table 6  Generated Time Series on ris
in  Malawi
(percentage)
Import  Consumption  Corporate  Other
Year  Tax  Tax  Income  Tax  Direct Taxes
1965  8.35  1.77  5.64  2.07
1966  11.65  1.91  6.75  2.00
19G7  15.28  1.26  9.47  2.12
1968  12.93  1.38  11.36  2.28
1969  15.05  2.32  12.56  2.93
1970  11.37  4.30  11.25  2.44
1971  11.44  5.43  11.85  2.18
1972  9.67  5.83  13.23  2.25
1973  8.97  6.10  11.70  2.29
1974  8.76  6.76  11.18  2.01
1975  7.07  6.82  14.98  2.02
1976  6.40  7.05  14.91  1.89
1977  7.46  7.60  15 58  1.96
1978  9.26  9.49  24.03  2.39
1979  10.24  11.24  20.94  2.67
1980  12.46  10.50  16.95  2.63
1981  18.30  10.88  13.90  2.64
1982  18.61  11.49  18.69  2.90
1983  18.27  11.39  20.76  2.97
1984  19.79  12.62  17.69  2.60
1985  21.31  11.38  25.24  2.46- 78  -
Table 7  Generated Time Series on Tis
in  Mauritius
Import  Consumption  Corporate  Other
Year  Tax  Tax  Income  Tax  Direct Taxes
1965  14.84  4.63  -
1966  14.69  4.98  3.39  2.69
1967  14.95  5.22  4.05  3.16
1968  15.20  5.29  4.53  3.15
1969  16.71  5.86  4.26  3.18
1970  14.59  5.50  3.12  2.93
1971  15.21  5.05  5.16  2.84
1972  14.66  5.02  3.86  2.86
1973  12.77  6.11  4.47  2.65
1974  9.20  5.08  3.42  2.23
1975  10.58  5.26  5.03  3.22
1976  12.28  4.84  7.21  6.15
1977  14.04  4.98  10.59  3.77
1978  15.66  5.47  6.24  3.33
1979  14.88  5.57  5.07  3.28
1980  16.19  5.13  3.41  2.68
1981  17.17  5.42  5.13  2.60
1982  15.98  5.35  3.80  2.53
1983  23.54  6.47  3.24  2.66
1984  22.02  7.29  2.93  2.59
1985  20.80  6.89  1.99  2.43
1986  23.53  6.98  1.84  1.87- 79 -
APPENDIX B: GENERALIZED VERSION OF THE MODEL
In Chapter II, all of the equatior.s  included in the model are
assumed to have a specific functional form, i.e., semi-log linear. This
assumption is relaxed in this annex and, hence, the generalized  version of
the model is discussed.
An individual tax yield assessed by tax inspectors is considered to
be a function of Xi and ri, that is,
(Ti*)t-  Fi[(Xi)t,  (ri)t]  (1)
Let us assume that tax inspectors  adjust actual tax revenues
towards their assessed level according to a partial adjustment mechanism,
that is,
A(Ti)t- Ai[(Ti*)t - (Ti)t.l]  (2)
Then, the actual tax y.eld function is obtained by substituting (2)
in (1), that is,
(Ti)t= (l-Ai)(Ti)t-l  +  AiFi[(Xi)t,(ri)t]  for i-l to n  (3)
where
(aTi/aXi)=coefficient  of built-in flexibility  of Ti with respect
to Xi (CBFXi),
(8ri/8ri)-own-DUMs  direct response
;  '  - - !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- 80 -
Using  the  concept  of the  "realized  individual  tax  rate"  defined  in
Chapter  II,  its  formula  will  have the  following  form  after  making  a simple
manipulation.
1  +  Git
rit=  rit  (4)
Git(l+Git)
1+  ( CBFXi  )  -
rio+  Git(CBFXi)
where rit is average effective tax rate of Ti at time "t"  and
(Gi)t=ln(X,)t-ln(Xi)o  (5)
In its final form, each individual tax  base is related to all ris
and GDP, that is,
(Xi)t - Di[(GDP)t, (rI)t  ..................  9(rn)t]  (6)
where
[(CBFXi)(pXi/3GDP)]-  coefficient of built-in flexibility of Ti with
respect to GDP (CBFYi),
(CBFXi)(8Xi/8ri)-  own-DTMs indirect  response, and
(CBFXi)  (83Xi/.-,j)=  cross DTMs indirect response.
Finally, the model is closed  by adding the overall tax revenue
identity, that is,
(T)t(Ti)t+  ..............  +(Tn)t  (7)- 81 -
Equations (3), (5), (6)  and (7)  perform the structural form of the
model. Parameters of the model are estimated after substituting equation
(4) in it.
After  estimating  CBFYis,  the  built-in  tax  elasticity  of each
individual tax  with respect to GDP will be:
Eit-  (CBFYi)  (GDP/ATi)t
where ATi is the adjusted tax revenue to  discretionary tax changes obtained
by simulating,  the  model for rit-riO.- 82 -
APPENDIX C: AN OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
This appendix provides a brief guideline on the application of the
model as an empirical framework for: (i)  estimating tax elasticity and the
revenue impact of DTMs, and (ii)  evaluating the macroeconomic impact of a
tax reform program aimed at generating additional revenue and/or dealing
with various tax related economic issues  which require converting the DTMs
included in the reform to AETRNs and vice versa.
i. Estimating Tax Elasticity and the Revenue Impact of DTMs
The structural form of the model is presented in Table 1. Estimates
of its parameters are obtained by estimating the parameters of the model
presented in Table 2.  Estimating its parameters requires time series data
on the following  variables, which are readily available for most countries
in GFS (an IMF publication) and the World Tables (a  World Bank
publication):
Td =Tax on domestic transactions
Tm -Tax on imports
Tc -Corporate income tax
To -Other direc. r-xes
T  =Overall  ta-'  re'4?nte  ret  of  export  taxes
Xd -Private consumption
Xc -Value added in non-agriculture sector net out of wage bill
Xm  -Imports
XO =GDP- 83 -
Table 1: Structural Form of the Model
log(Td)t- AdadO+ Xdadll0g(Xd)t  + (I-Ad)lvg(Td)t-l+  Adad2(7d)t+ Udt
log(Tm)t-  Amamo+ Amamllog(Xm)t  +  (l-Xm)log(Tm)t-l+  Aemm2(Tm)t+  Umt
log(Tc)t=  Ac%cO+ AXccllog(Xc)t  +  (l-Ac)log(Tc)t-l+  Acac2(Tc)t+  Uct
log(To)t=  Aoaoo+  Aoaollog(Xo)t  +  (l-Ao)log(To)t-l+  Aoao2(ro)t+  Uot
l(Xd)t=  fidO  Odlln(yd)t+ fd2(rm/rd)t+ udt
ln(Xm)t=  PmO+ Pmlln(GDP)t+ flm2(rm/Td)t+  Pm3(rc)t + Vmt
ln(Xc)t-  PcO+  Pclln(GDP)t+  Pc2(7c)t  +  fc3(rm/fd)t+  vct
ln(T)t  =  0+  dln(Td)t+  Smln(Tm)t+  6cln(Tc)t+  6oln(To)t
ln(Yd)t  =  70 +7yln(GDP)t+  721n(TC)t+  -y31n(To)t
(rm/rd)t=  00  +  l(rm)t  +  02(td)t
where,
Td- Tax on domestic transactions (endogenous  variable),
t Tc=1  - w  !  r  r  r  e5-  ,  .fe  r>-,
To- Other  direct taxes &cndogenous  variable),
Xd= Private consumption (endogenoun  variAble),
….lt--  - - _s~ :_  ;  ;__;_  . g.l;t
Xc- Value  adodei. I!-  AsgenCsa;bZ
Xv-  CD°-  grcss  domestic  r,oducts  (exoRenuus  va&1d1,1>)
r1 - The  it" 'Lndividual  realized tax rate (exogenous  variable),
tor i= d, m, c, o,
Yd- Disposable income (endogenous  variable),
T= Total tax revenue net of export taxes (endogenous  variable).- 84 -
Table 2: Entire Model with Estimable Parameters*
I-  l+gd 
ln(Td)t- Xd*dO+  AdQdlln(Xd)t  + (l-Xd)ln(Td)t-l  +IXdad2  rd  +dt
1+,\dadlgd  -t
ln(Tm)t  AmamO+ Amamlln(Xm)t  +  (l-Am)ln(Tm)t  l  +Amam4rm  l+g  +mt
1+,\mamlgm t
ln(Tc)t= XcacO+ Acaclln(Xc)t  + (l-Xc)ln(Tc)tl  +Xcac2Irc  -+g- 1  +
l+,\caclgc  Jt
[  l+Aago  1t
ln(To)t  XoaOo+ Aoaolln(Xo)t  + (l-Xo)ln(To)tl  r  +o  |  +ot
l+Aotolgo it
r  rm,[  (l+gm)/(l+amlgm)]  1
ln(Xd)t  - fdO+ Pdlln(yd)t+  fld2  [rdl  egm/l+amg  )]  + vdt
rdl(l+gd)/(]+adlgd)]  tld
ln(X  -Oo+Omll(GDP)tpm  rm  [(  l+gm)  /  (  +amlgm)  ]  rc  (l+gc  )
ln(Xm)tfmO+  mll (GDP)t+m2  +lm3  +vmt
rdf(l+gd)/(I+adlgd)]-  t  (I+Oclgc)
+d  1  rm(l+gm)/(l+emlgm)
ln(Xc)t=  RcO+  3clln(GDP)t+  BC9  rd  ,.  1+  .
14..-.  1,  I  .(t1 4.og\Jf!- 4  L-dlgd  t  L-U'-'  \C'  '-'  uF  .ol/J  -l_
nfT  j  ,  ,  U- 3.an(Th:?;  +  2  l  T.)+  6Cln(Tc)t+  60 1n(To)t
-;d;  ti il;-  2  f  1cSt:  731n(TO)t
9(i)t  l'(Xi)t-  ln(Xi)O  for  i=d,  in,  C,  O
*  Estimating the parameters of the model requires time series data on Tis, T,
Xis, ris and GDP which are readily available for most LDCs in GFS(an IMF
publication) and World Tables (a  World Bank publication).- 85 -
Yd=Disposable income
ri-The ith individual  average effective tax rate (T/X),
for i-d, m, c, o, and
GDP- Gross domestic product.
Using these time series data, the efficient and consistent estimates of the
parameters of the model presented in Table 2 are obtained by means of a
simultaneous-equation econometric technique.
A within-sample dynamic simulation is performed for all the
endogenous variables included in the model in order to generate time series
data on gis. Using this data and estimates of Ais and ais, time series data
on ris are generated by means of the following equation.
- ~(1 +  gi)t
(ri)t  [  (ri)t  (-]
(1 + Xiailgi)  t
The generated time series data on ris can be used independently to explore
the impact of changes in each individual tax system on key macroeconomic
variables such as inflation,  economic growth, budget deficit, real exchange
rate and internathonal  balance of paymentR. To linearize the structural
form of the msodel  presented in Table 1, tl-hese  data are used to estimate thz
pArAn1terE  of-  the  follc;ir'-  rN-mi;  d'  -r  -crds, t_
linearize (r,jr.  !) lcinci  one '-f  tcchnfccLn.J  .q  ...-  '  ii  the  Le;Xt
(Tm/rd)t=  00  +  0 1(7m)t  +  82(7d)t- 86 -
Now, by substituting the estimated  value of the parameters in the
original equations of the model presented in  Table 1, the structural form
of the model with estimated parameters (SFM) is obtained.
The short run and the long run elasticities  of individual tax
yields and base and overall tax revenue  wich respect to GDP, and the direct
and indirect responses of each individual  tax yield to the changes in its
own and other individual tax systems are simply obtained either by
substituting the estimated parameters into the formulas presented in Tables
3 to 7 of the text or by directly solving the SFM as an ordinary and a
difference equations systems and, hence, deriving the reduced (RFM) and
final (FFM) forms of the  model.1
ii. Evaluatine/Designing  A Ouantitative Tax Reform Program
The reduced/final form of the  model can be used as an empirical
framework to evaluate the sport run/long run macroeconomic impact of a tax
reform program and to forecast a government's  revenues from various sources
of taxation.  However  this requires converting the proposed DTMs to ris or
vice versa. An example from Malawi is considered to illustrate  how to
convert the proposed DTMs to ris and vice versa.
Let us assume that the Malawian government wants to raise total
tax revenue by 5.67 percent using statutory surtax rate (SSR)  as a policy
instrument-  Then,  the  eue!Etions  are:  How much  of  an  increase  in  the  surtax
rate  will  result  in  a  5  67  percent  increase  in  total  tax  revenlie?  And  what
'zS  -cvz.  t.  ^  impct  n4^f^rtli,7  1  °  )o
these quesLions requires quantitative  knowledge ua LLie iimpact  of  a  orne
percentage point increase in SSR on both its corresponding and other
1/ For more details on solution of a dynamic macroeconometric model see
Ehdaie (1987).- 87 -
individual  tax  yields  and  bases. Providing  such  information,  first  of all,
requires  converting  a one  percentage  point  increase  in SSR  to  rd.
In this  country,  surtax  was introduced  in  1970/71  at a statutory
tax  rate  of 18  percent.  Then,  this  rate  was increased  to  25 percent  in
1983/84. Given  one  of these  DTMs,  say  the  former,  and  time  series  data  on
rd,  the  amount  of increase  in  Td due  to a  one  percentage  point  increase  in
SSR is  calculated  as follows. As a result  of introducing  surtax  in  1970
(fiscal  year 1970/71),  Td rose  from  2.32  percent  in  1969  to  4.30  percent  in
1970 (see  Table  6 in  Appendix  A).  Given  18  percent  SSR,  rd  went  up by
0.111  percentage  points  due  to  a one  percent  point  increase  in  SSR (the
same  result  is  obtained  using  the  DTMs  of 1983/84).
It is  apparent  from  the  coefficient  of  Td in the  overall  tax
e(quation  presented  in Table  11  of the  text  that  total  tax  revenue  will  rise
by 5.67  percent  as result  of a one  percentage  point  increase  in  7d, whose
equivalent  is  a 9 percentage  point  increase  in  the  statutory  surtax  rate.
In other  words,  the  new  SSR  will  be 34  percent  (25  percent  plus 9  percent)
which  will  result  in  a 5.67  percent  increase  in  overall  tax  yield.
Using  the  coefficients  of rd in  the  other  equations  included  in
the  model  presented  in  Table  11 of the  text,  the  macroeconomic  impact  of
this  di8cretionary  tax  measure  will  us as follows.  First,  tax  on imports
>-.  wi  i--creasc  by 0.73  and  18.81  percLZt-
re.spcc4-Je&y.  S-conc,  corporate  income  tax  will decline  by 0.11  Percent.
iiiild,  pri-vave  cousw-nption  ana  vaiue  aaded  in  the  non-agriculture  sector  of
the  economv  will  fall  by 0.65  and  0.13  percent  respectively,  and  finally,
imports  will  rise  by 0.81  percent.- 88 -
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